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3Preface
This paper analyses property development processes, the organisation of the property
development industry, the driving forces behind property development, and the effects of
market imperfections and market failures on urban property markets. The analysis is placed
in the context of Dutch cities.
The greater part of this study concerns the development of an institutional economic theory
of urban property market functioning. Theoretical approaches to property development
processes have not yet been developed on a very large scale, although the recent literature
shows a growing interest in these processes. The building and rebuilding of cities is now
frequently under investigation; the present study intends to join with this newly developed field
of interest. Nevertheless, it is believed that a solid theoretical concept is still missing. We try
to fill this gap by reverting to literature in the field of new institutional economics. This
theoretical concept is operationalised in such a way that the strategies of the actors in the
development process can be explained. Several studies have shown the importance of
institutional relations in the property development industry; an institutional theory of
development processes seems to us, therefore, an almost self-evident choice. Special
attention is given to imperfect market conditions and market failures and the way they
structure property development, since it is believed that urban property markets are imperfect
by nature and that market failures are a common characteristic of these markets.
The study is explicitly presented as a discussion paper, since we are well aware of the fact
that many issues that are discussed in this paper are not yet sufficiently dealt with. It is our
intention to develop the ideas expressed in the paper in subsequent work; comments and
suggestions for improvements are therefore welcome.
Finally, a large part of this paper has been written during a stay that one of us (Erwin van der
Krabben) made at the Centre for Research in European Urban Environments at the University
of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Great Britain. Many thanks to Professor Patsy Healey and other
members of CREUE for their hospitaliry and stimulating discussions!
41. INTRODUCTION
Cities are characterised by a continually changing spatial-economic structure; new
developments taking place on the edges of towns, redevelopments o1 inner-city areas,
renovations or demolishments of obsolete buildings, etc. In an international context we can
easily observe substantial differences in the way these developments take place. The following
examples confirm our thesis. First, the spatial dispersal of the retail trade in the Netherlands
is remarkably different from, for instance, that in Great Britain, France, Belgium and Germany.
In the Netherlands, retail trade is almost completely concentrated in inner-city areas and, in
addition to this, in some sub-shopping centres in the neighbourhoods. Shopping centres in
peripheral locations on the edges of towns, which are characteristic of the retail structure in
other West-European countries, are not to be found.
Second, both the price-setting processes and the locational structure on the office market
varies considerably among West-European countries. Confining ourselves again to the
situation in the Netherlands, we note relatively low office rents in Dutch cities - even on top
locations in the four large cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Moreover,
there are only small variations in office rents between top locations and peripheral locations,
a relatively low quality of office buildings and a spreading of office buildings over many
locations within cities, instead of a concentration on a few locations, as is characteristic of
most West-European countries. In the Netherlands, international top locations, measured from
the level of office rents, are missing.
Third, in contrast with the situation in Great Britain, the property development industry in the
Netherlands shows no interest in investing in new buildings for the manufacturing industry, let
alone that they should build speculatively on this market. As a result, in the Netherlands the
industrial building stock is entirely 'produced' by industrial companies, financing for themselves
the building for their own use. Besides, and perhaps in certain respects in contrast to the
former, the industrial building stock in the Netherlands is far less obsolete compared to the
building stock in Great Britain. Studies in Great Britain have shown that the obsolete industrial
building stock acts as a constraint to economic growth.
Fourth, it is remarkable that in the Dutch housing market new houses are usuafly developed
as large tracts by property developers, while in other countries - Germany and Befgium are
the extreme examples in this respect - owners build their own houses on more or less
isolated locations. The consequences for urban spatial structures may be far more drastic than
generally seems to be assumed - at least when we review the lack of attention for this
5phenomenon in the international literature on urban dynamics. Dutch cities are characterised
by large, monotonous, but high-qualiry new expansions; in Germany and Belgium these seem
to be absent.
It is not coincidentally that we mention here examples of international differences in all sectors
of the urban property market. By doing this, we intend to show that these variations are not
exceptions, but rather a sine qua non to urban development processes. It is not difficult at all
to find more striking dissimilarities in urban property market functioning in West-European
countries and, even to a larger extent, between West- and East-European and Third World
countries (of which we know much less). It is hard to believe that these variations in the
outcome of development processes can fully be understood with help of the concept of optimal
allocation that is central to standard neo-classical models of urban development. This concept
implies that the demand of firms, institutions and households for buildings is met by supply
and that market mechanisms lead to an equilibrium in which all these firms, institutions and
households, given their budgets and their preierences, find themselves in optimal locations
in a building of their choice. For this would mean that the above-listed international variations
in urban development processes are the result of differences in budget constraints and
preferences of the actors looking for new locations and new buildings. Perhaps, in some cases
budgets and preferences are different, but we cannot think of any reason why they would be
different on such a large scale as is shown in the above examples. The fact that the spatial
dispersal of the retail trade in the Netherlands is so different from the structure in the other
above-mentioned countries is, much more likely, due to the more influential municipal power
in the Netherlands. Dutch municipalities do not allow new retail developments on peripheral
locations, because they want to protect the economic continuity of the inner-city shopping
areas. Perhaps municipalities in other countries would like to do the same, but they do not
have at their disposal the same influential set of instruments. Besides, the argument that
price-making processes on urban property markets should only be a matter of demand and
supply is hard to defend; an unjustifiable oversimplification of realiry. The development of
office rents, for instance, is a much more complicated process than it is assumed to be in
neo-classical models. Low office rents in Dutch cities are closely related to the lack of scarcity
that is characteristic of urban land markets. Municipalities supply almost alI building land and
consider it as their task to care for an invariably sufficient amount of available building plots.
The result of all this is that property developers and financial institutions are now complaining
that development gains on office markets are too small (as a consequence of the lack of
6scarcity). At the same time, the central government complains that urban redevelopment plans
can only be carried out heavily subsidized, because the revenues from land sales by
municipalities are not high enough. Both market parties and the central government believe
that the problems can be solved by creating an artificial scarcity on urban land markets -
although they seem to differ in their view if the government is indeed able to create this
scarcity.
This is an outstanding example of a situation in which market parties try to influence demand
and supply without making use of market processes: they try to change the rulesthat are part
of the institutional structure. It must be noted that, in this case, they lobbied successfully. The
content of the national planning report (the VINEX report) has been changed according to their
wishes: the creation of a few international top locations for office developments is now the
official government policy.
This short introduction shows that we need a much more sophisticated theoretical concept of
urban development processes. Of course, theoretical models may be a simplification of reality,
but it is essential that they still keep their connection to reality. We will argue in this paper that
this connection is missing in neo-classical urban models. Consequently, we will develop an
alternative theoretical model of urban dynamics, based on institutional economic theory. We
believe that this model offers more realistic explanations for urban development processes.
After a further examination of our problem area in Section Two, we will define the objectives
of this paper more precisely.
72. THE PROVISION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
The field of urban studies comprises much more than just the neo-classical models that are
mentioned in the introductionary section. These studies have in common that they analyze the
urban spatial structure and the way this structure is shaped by economic processes. The
urban spatial structure is, logically, the outcome of processes taking place on the urban land
and property market, where demand for land and property by firms, households and
institutions meets with the supply of land and property by actors operating on the supply-side
of this market - the development industry. However - and this has been brought to light in
particular by Ball (1986) and Healey and Barrett (1990) - the processes through which these
changes in urban spatial structures have been accomplished have been almost completely
neglected in the international literature on urbanisation and urban development. Ball has
argued that 'the built environment in urban theories is generally treated as a passive backdrop
to other social processes' (Ball, 1986, p. 447). According to Ball, the neglect of the provision
of the buift environment' has arisen because in urban theories the built environment is usually
seen in functionalist terms, with emphasis placed on the uses to which built structures are put.
He considers this not only as a shortcoming in empirical urban studies, but as a fundamental
theoretical weakness as well. In his view, any urban theory in which the production of the built
environment is ignored, is not able to explain urban development properly. To fill this gap in
urban theory in general, and in Marxist urban theory in particular, Ball suggests identifying
different structures of building provision and focusing on the social relations within these
structures.z Empirical research should be directed to the analysis of these structures of
building provision.
Healey and Barrett observe the same shortcoming in urban theory.
'The role of landownership, the organisation of the construction industry, the nature of
the finance invested in urban development and the significance ofintermediaries, from
developers to property consultants, lie hidden or are given little more than a passing
reference in many historical accounts of urban development (...)' (Healey and Barrett,
1990, p. 89).
Ball has defined the provision of the built environment as 'the production, exchange, distribution and use
of a built structure. The actors involved may be landowners, developers, building firms, building workers,
financiers, building owners and final users (Ball, 1986, p. 455).
z Ball defines these structures of building provision as follows: 'the concept highlights the existence of specific
sets of historically specific and country-specific social relations involved in the creation and use of particular
types of buildings' (Ball, 1986: p. 448).
8In another article we have argued that in traditional urban economic theory3 - characterised
by a search for explanations for urban dynamics - only a one-way relationship between
economic and spatial structures is recognised; urban spatial structures are explained with
economic arguments (Van der Krabben and Lambooy, 1993). The attention that is given in
urban economic literature to the impact of economic processes on the spatial structure has
resulted in an overemphasis on the demand side of the urban system: the locational
preferences of firms, institutions and households are held responsible for urban development.
It seems to be commonly assumed that the supply of land and property adjusts to the demand
side and that the urban property market - on which the provision of the built environment
takes place - functions perfectly as a go-between. Consequently, the property development
process is not considered to be a theoretical problem area.
The starting point for this article is our strong belief that in many different cases demand and
supply relations on urban land and property markets are indeed problematic. Similar to both
Ball's and Healey and Barrett's lines of argument, we therefore intend to focus on the property
development process, and, more explicitly, on the relations between the groups of actors that
are involved in this process.
Especially Healey and Barrett's article has been followed by a remarkable and still growing
amount of contributions to this field of research (see Section Three). This may be true,
however, only in the British context, for in an international context the property development
process still remains an almost unexplored field of research.'
These contributions can all more or less be classified as institutional approaches to land and
property development. They have certainly produced a much better understanding of the
meaning of institutional relations on land and property markets. However, we believe that in
institutional analyses a convincing and powerful theoretical concept is still missing, resulting
in rather a description of property development processes than an explanation of these
processes. This is partly due to the fact that institutíonal economic theory still lacks a rigorous
theoretical structure.
Neo-classical theory, on the contrary, does provide such a structure. In models based on
We distinguish three mainstreams in urban economic theory: neo-classical theory, Marxist approaches and
institutional theory; see also Bassett and Short (1980), Lake (1983), Healey and Barrett (1990), Bovaird
(1993).
A major research project by Dieterich, Williams and Wood (eds.) (1993) that is now under way and that
describes the functioning of land and property markets in six West-European countries tries to fill this gap
in research.
9neo-classical concepts, land markets have primarily an allocative function, structured by
demand and the price mechanism, in a sense that it will be used for its most profitable
purpose.5 However, most authors in this field of research do not address the processes
underlying the development of land and buildings. To these processes much less attention has
been paid.
A more fundamental shortcoming of these models - we mentioned this already in Section One
- is that in neo-classical theory only one function of the market is emphasized: allocation; the
focusing on decisions of consumers and producers within a given context. Each person will
seek an optimum situation to satisfy his needs, given a certain budget. Markets will clear until
an equilibrium is settled.
Next to many other theoretical problems, neo-classical economic models lack a good
approach to dynamism: how the budgets, the preferences and the context have evolved is no
theoretical problem! In a perfect market, allocation through the market mechanism is sufficient
to achieve an optimal solution. In markets that do not meet this condition, a different
mechanism is necessary. Recent developments in micro-economic theory accept that more
realistic approaches are needed - in particular about the problem of coordination outside the
market as well as through the market. We have to find an answer to the question whether
economic theory has developed a body of knowledge related to the coordination of decisions
in markets that are not perfect; in other words, a theoretical model shaped for a
heterogeneous market that does not function perfectly at all should not only focus on problems
of allocation, but also on problems of coordination. These are precisely the fields of interest
in both new institutional economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985) and neo
institutional economics (Hodgson, 1988, 1992; Etzioni, 1988) 6
This article will argue that urban land and property markets are an outstanding example of
s
See for example Alonso (1964), Wingo (1961), Muth (1969), Mills (1972), Richardson (1977), Harrison
(1977), Needham (1981), Evans (1985), Wiltshaw (1985).
It is not very clear what should be understood by 'institutional economic theory.' In this article we focus
almost exclusively on new institutional economics. New institutional economic theory is primarily based on
Coase's Noble Prize Winning article 'The Nature of the Firm' (Coase, 1937) and, much later, further
elaborated by Williamson in his transaction cost approach (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Besides, the concept
of neo institutionat economics which is introduced and described by, in particular, Hodgson (1988) gets
much attention in economic literature. This concept may be considered as a more radical version of new
institutional economics. However, to make things even more confusing, Eggertsson (1990) and North (1990)
have both developed a concept based on institutional theory which they also indicate as 'neo institutional
economic theory'. Nevertheless we consider their work more as belonging to the field of 'new institutional
economics' - we will explain this in Section 4.
Finally, in this article we leave aside three other approaches in institutional theory: traditional institutional
economics (see Nagelkerke, 1992), new institutional sociology (Granovetter, 1985; see also Amin and Thrift,
1993), and economic sociology (Zukin and DiMaggio, 19..).
10markets that do not operate smoothly, having resulted in, among other things, a wide range
of institutional arrangements. We believe that the often very complicated relationships between
actors operating on either the demand side or the supply side and the significant influence by
intermediaries on urban property markets cannot be explained properly by a model focusing
mainly on the user demand for land and buildings - neglecting, for one thing, the investment
demand for property - as neo-classical models do. Besides, there is a growing amount of
literature investigating supply-side constraints on land and property markets;' the neo-
classical concept of market imperfections is too limited in its approach to these constraints.~'
Therefore, a model that emphasizes market imperfections ("urban property markets are
imperfect by nature") and that recognises the problem of coordination should lead to better
results in explaining the functioning of urban land and property markets.
The two thoughts that underlie this paper can now be summarized as follows. First,
international differences in property market functioning make it clear that if we want to
understand the way these markets function, we need an approach that not only explains
supply~demand relations, but that also puts the institutional context at the centre of its
analysis. Second, the fact that the literature in the field of urban economics has shown a
remarkable lack of interest in the processes that are responsible for the provision of the built
environment, seems to point to the assumption that these processes are mostly
unproblematic. The objective of this article is to investigate the possibility of building up a
conceptual framework based on the ideas of new institutional economics, which is meant to
bring us a better understanding of land and properry development processes. Special attention
will be paid to situations in which these processes do not go smoothly and hinder economic
growth. We will develop a concept of market imperfections and market failure on urban real
estate markets. To be able to do so, we must first turn to fundamental economic theory - with
this term we refer to non-urban economic theory -, because a better understanding is needed
of what should be the essential elements of such a framework. As an example of the
usefulness of this framework, we will use the model to interpret some special characteristics
of the way Dutch urban land and property markets function.
To prevent misunderstandings as to the intentions of this paper, we stress that the objective
of this paper is not in the first place to falsify the concept of new institutional economics when
applied to urban land and properry markets or to prove that neo-classical theory is wrong in
,
See MacGregor et a!. (1985), Evans (1985), Perry (1986), Fothergill et al. (1987), Adams et al. (1988, 1991,
1992, 1993a,b,c), Henneberry (1988), Howes (1989), and Van der Krabben and Boekema (1993). Adams
et al. (1993c) offers a good overview of these contributions.
11its assumptions about human behaviour. We are primarily concerned with achieving a better
understanding of land and property development processes. The use of 'institutional
economics' in the context of this paper must be seen as a tool and not as a goal in itself. We
expect that this theory can provide us with a'vocabulary' that enables to address the
mechanisms that underlie land and property development processes and the interrelationships
between agents who operate on the urban property market.
The next section will discuss the way in which urban economic theory in general has dealt
with the property development process. It is argued that urban research in general falls short
on three different points. First, often the provision of the built environment is totally neglected;
second, mainstream urban economics fails to provide a proper explanation with respect to the
imperfections that are characteristic to urban land and property markets; and third, many
institutional approaches get stuck in a description of urban development without answering the
question of why developments take place in the way they do, in different periods of time and
in different locations. In Section Four the fundamental differences between neo-classical and
institutional economics and the basic premises of the latter will be discussed. This will be the
basis of Section Five, in which the concept of institutional economics will be applied to the
functioning of urban land and property markets. In Section Six the concepts of market
impertections and market faiiure are discussed. Situations are investigated in which
supply~demand relations are problematic (and result in market failure). Some special
characteristics of Dutch urban land and property markets will be examined with the help of the
conceptual framework (particular attention will be given to the choice of {~olicy instruments to
improve the functioning of the market). Finally, in Section Seven we comment on the
usefulness of this methodology.
123. URBAN ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
A GAP IN URBAN RESEARCH
As was argued in the previous section, urban economic theory can be divided into three
mainstreams: neo-classical theory, Marxist approaches and institutional analyses. It is not our
attention to give a full description of the premises and the structure of the conceptual models
based on these theories (Section Four will deal with the fundamental differences between
neo-classical and institutional theory). What is emphasized here is that in urban economic
theory - and with this term we refer especially to mainstream urban economics - the provision
of the built environment is not, in general, a part of the theories' study objective and,
consequently, is not treated as a problem area. Elsewhere we have mentioned - partly
following Healey and Barrett's article - several reasons why more attention should be paid to
land and property development processes (Van der Krabben and Lambooy, 1993). Among
other things, the way in which land and property are themselves 'produced' and 'consumed'
enters into the processes of economic production and consumption, the problem oflocational
inertia - and supply constraints in general - impedes urban economic growth, and there will
always be allocation problems of space, time and factor costs. As a result, in the Netherlands
little attempt is made to conceptualise the results of empirical property research - to a large
extent carried out by municipalities, consultancies and academics.e It is in the first place the
task of academics to provide a theoretical framework to interpret these results. However, until
recently, there has been a striking lack of academic attention given to the processes
underlying the production of land and buildings. Property researchers, for their part, have only
marginally been interested in theoretical approaches, while the debate in urban economic
theory has mainly been focused on explanations of changes in locational choices by firms and
of differences in economic growth between urban regions. The provision of the built
environment has never been integrated in these theories9
Although the implications of the processes underlying the provision of the built environment
for the functioning of urban economies are highly underestimated, in each of the disciplines
nevertheless examples of attempts to develop theories on the property development process
9
9
See Healey and Barrett (1990) on this point. They use a similar line of argument reflecting the situation in
Great Britain.
In the Netherlands, only from the mid-1980s the study of property markets has acquired an formal status
in academic research, by the establishment of the Stichting voor Beleggings- en Vastgoedkunde (University
of Amsterdam).
13are on hand. However, these theoretical contributions must clearly be distinguished from the
more general approaches in both neo-classical and Marxist tradition in which, respectively,
the demand for land (neo-classical models) and the struggle between landowners and other
capital owners (Marxist models) are considered to be the explaining variables with respect to
urban development. It is true that the literature in this field addresses the functioning of land
markets, but it does not deal with the processes underlying the provision of land and property.
Ball and Harloe (1993) use a similar argument. According to these authors, 'such approaches
(neo-classical Alonso-style models and Marxist-style urban rent theory - EvdFVJL) tried to
embrace within a simple set of land rent postulates many aspects of property development
and urban structure' (Ball and Harloe, 1993: p. 9).
Healey and Barrett ( 1990), regarding neo-classical models, indicate that there have been
some attempts to analyze land and property development processes using neo-classical
concepts.'a In Section Two, Ball's argument against the fundamental theoretical weakness
in Marxist approaches has already been quoted (Ball, 1986). Authors who do pay attention
to property development processes from a Marxist point of view include Ball (1983) and
Harvey (1982, 1985)." Especially Harvey's work on the meaning of finance capital for the
built environment and on the circuits of capital and the role of the production of the built
environment wíthin them has received much attention.'Z Harvey provides a framework for
analysis and, as Healey and Barrett note, 'a way of identifying how the dynamics of the mode
of production drive the processes through which the built environment is produced, while at
the same time recognising the spatial and temporal specificities of these processes' (Healey
and Barrett, 1990: p. 93). Ball's critique of Harvey's work is in this respect worth mentioning.
He argues that 'in his work (Harvey's, EvdIVJL) an overwhelming capital logic appears,' and
'the capital logic of Harvey's work is continually expressed in the functionalism assigned to the




Notably, Brown et al. (1981), Dowall (1984) and Lin Leung (1987).7). Besides, Cheshire et al. (1985) have
tried to assess the economic costs of the British planning system (all mentioned in Healey and Barrett,
1990). However, the most complete neo-classical explanation for property market functioning can be found
in Harvey (1992).
Ball's Structures of Housing Provision - concept is not necessarily an inherently neo-Marxist approach -
as the author argues himself in Ball and Harloe (1992) - with the implication that it is useless outside this
theoretical corpus. However, it can be used in combination with Marxist theory, as has been done in Ball
(1983).
Again, to mention only a few contributions in the neo-Marxist tradition: Ball et a!. (1985), Fne (1986), Haila
(1988), King (1989a,b,c), Berry and Huxley (1992), Houghton (1993).
See also Haila (1992) for a critique on Harvey's work.
14In the tradition of institutional approaches, attempts to analyze the property development
process are all of a very recent date, most of them more or less following Healey and Barrett's
article 'Structure and Agency in Land and Property Development Processes: Some Ideas for
Research.'" This literature already begins to produce a much better understanding of the
property development process. However, until now all these studies focus exclusively on the
British context. Outside Britain, much less is known about the meaning of institutional relations
in property development processes. Moreover, in institutional analyses a convincing and
powerful theoretical concept is still missing, resulting in rather descriptions of property
development processes than in explanations of these processes.15 For one thing, in many
studies it remains unclear what is meant with terms like institutions, institutional context, and
institutional relations. In Section 4.3 we will provide some definitions.
One might argue that with help of institutional analysis - in the way it is described above -
we are perfectly able to describe the different situations that may occur with respect to the
organisation of the property development industry and supplyidemand relations. However,
without explicit assumptions with respect to human behaviour and the meaning of the
institutional context, these descriptions will never possess the status of a theory (and that is
what we are looking for). In this respect we refer to a recent discussion of the concept of
Structures of Housing Provision by the authors who introduced this concept (Ball and
Harloe). We consider the SHP-concept as an example of the type of institutional analysis that
we discussed above. Their argument is as follows:
'What is the theoretical status of the concept of SHP? It is obviously theoretical in
nature as if is derived in thought. It is abstract for that reason and because it tries to
encompass the principal features observed into a relatively simple organising
framework. It does not of itself 'explain' any housing issue but is instead claimed to be
a useful theoretical tool. To be useful however it must be combined with wider social
theories, methodologies of empirical investigation and where necessary statistical
analysis. As such the concept can be seen as an intermediate or operational one that
has no useful life of its own but that can powerfully reveal causalities when used in the
appropriate combinations' (Ball and Harloe, 1993: p. 4).
New Institutional Economics must be considered as just one of the wider social theories that
Notably, Davoudi and Usher (1990), Healey and Nabarro (eds.) (1990), Healey (1991, 1992, 1993a,b),
Healey, Davoudi, O'Toole, Tavsanoglu and Usher (eds.) (1992). See also Adams et al. (1993).
Hooper (1992), in a comment on Healey's paper 'Models of the development process: a review', holds the
same argument.
15can be combined with the operational concepts by Healey or Ball.
What the result of omitting this might be is shown in Gore and Nicholson (1991). They
describe different models of the development process that do not seem to have any theoretical
background at all (except one neo-classical model). Moreover, it is difficult to find any method
in their approach - the main differences between the models seem to be that the one model
is more detailed than the other -, and it is not very clear what might be the use of such a
description. These models may be helpful in analyzing property development processes, but
they are certainly not of much help in explaining why or why not developments take place on
certain locations and what the impact is of the strategies of the different participants in the
development process.
As is clear from the above, there is thus far little agreement on the theoretical concept that
should be used and what the necessary elements of such a concept should be. What is
needed now, as Healey argues, is a theoretical model of the property development process
'which would enable the detail of agency relationships in the negotiation of
development projects to be captured while at the same time allowing generalisation
about how these relationships might vary under different conditions. However, the
traditional approaches are only able to deal with market conditions, while only in some
of these conditions market conditions might prevail. Nor do these models adequately
address the way the interest and strategies of actors are actively constituted as
circumstances change and how this relafes to broader structural shifts' (Healey, 1991:
p. 236).
A model should be developed that helps to explain why a certain development takes place on
a particular location at a particular time and how this is structured by changes in the economic
system and the institutional context.76
In this paper, we concentrate on the development of a model based on institutional economic
theory, partly because in this field of economic theory, especially, approaches to property
development are lacking and partly just because institutional theory can contribute to a better
i6 Haila has also offered an approach to theorize property development processes (Haila, 1992). She has
similarly developed different models of the development process. The main difference with the present
approach is that these are not in the same way based on the traditions in urban economic theory. Haila
argues in favour of a special real estate theory, because the special characteristics of land and property
markets make it impossible to compare supplyldemand relations with respect to the production and
consumption of land and buildings with supplyldemand relations in other markets. We do not deny that such
an approach might lead to interesting results, but we think it better to connect with the richness of
information about urban development processes that urban theory has brought forward. Besides, we believe
that institutional economic theory is able to incorporate in its conceptual scheme the speclal characteristics
of property markets.
16understanding of the functioning of property markets." As announced, for this purpose we
first turn to the fundamentals of economic theory.
" In another paper, models of the development process based on neo-classical and Marxist theory will be
developed. See also Healey (1991b).
174. ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION; THE DEFINITION OF ECONOMICS
Economists are continuously confronted with new problems. With respect to urban property
markets, the current international crisis in property development and the often problematic
succession of booms and slumps following each other in increasingly shorter periods of time
is exemplary. Economics is, therefore, necessarily a dynamic science. The impact of the
present growing complexity of markets on economic theory is possibly of such importance that
the definition of economics has to be reconsidered.
The definition of economics has implications for the kind of questions economists perceive and
for the choice of instruments devised to resolve the (perceived) problems. There is nothing
against retaining the classical definition of Robbins, based on scarcity, preferences and limited
means. It is a clear conception, and it offered a sound basis for analysis. Economics was
considered to be a science, in which the emphasis was on the decision-making process
taking place under well-defined conditions. Robbins defined economics as follows:
'the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and
scarce means which have alternative uses. (...) When the time and the means for
achieving ends are limited and capable of alternative application, and the ends are
capable ofbeing distinguished in order ofimportance, then behaviour necessarily takes
the form of choice (...) !t has an economic aspect' (Robbins, 1935: p. 14-16).
The Dutch economist Hennipman (1945) also stressed this approach towards a closed
definition, setting apart economics as a separate science, based on a formal approach and
not on the base of a certain sector of social life. Hennipman (1945: p.5) emphasizes that
economics is a science of man and of human behaviour. The Austrian School similarly
stresses human behaviour as the focus of economic theory, but differs in its definition of
economics. This School emphasizes that humans not only choose between given ends but
that human behaviour is 'purposeful.' Kirzner, for instance, criticises Robbins' definition:
'Robbins' structure of ends and means (...) ignores the fact that ends are never
presented to the actor coincidentally with the means (...) Ends can be conceived as
observable states of affairs only after their achievement. At the time of the
contemplation of action, ends are to the actor only anticipations of future hoped-for
states of affairs' (Kirzner, 1976: p. 125).
His second critique is related to the fact that 'ends' are not objective, but subjective. Kirzner
18adds a third point, namely that the ends-means dichotomy is an oversimplification: 'Ends may
be considered as means to further ends, and (...) means may be equally well considered as
the ends of earlier actions' (ibid.: p. 125). He identifies instead two insights as basic to
economics: 'First there is the insight that human action is purposeful, and second that there
is an indeterminacy and unpredictability inherent in human preferences, human
expectationism, and human knowledge' (ibid.: p. 42,43).
The conclusion is that Robbins' definition can only be considered as a special case within a
broader framework, valid only when ends and means are given beforehand. Most so-called
'general theories' are in fact very special cases and not general at all.
4.1 Allocation and Coordination
Neo-classical theory emphasizes one function of the market: allocation. Decisions are taken
within a set of limiting conditions, such as given preferences, given budgets, and a given
period of time. For individual producers and consumers, the efficient allocation of given
means, of production and of income over given goals depends on relative prices and the
relative positions of the demand and supply curves. This relates to the character of a theory
as a framework for decision-making, under severe restrictions. In a perfect market, allocation
through the market mechanism is sufficient to achieve an optimal solution of the coordination
problem. In markets that do not meet this condition, a different mechanism is necessary. In
a'pure market,' coordination between individual decision-makers is smooth, because of the
basic assumptions of full information, full mobility, full divisibiliry and correct prices. As soon
as these assumptions are not accepted as real, we have to find an answer to the question
whether economic theory has developed a body of knowledge related to the coordination of
decisions in markets that are not perfect.
The debate between the Austrians and the Anglo-Saxon neo-classical and Keynesian
theorists already focused on this problem, but it was distorted by the fact that it was restricted
to the distinction between central planning and the perfect market. In a later approach - the
one by Keynes - the need for government guidelines was accepted, and even the need for
active government participation in investment and consumption. Keynes accepted the need
for institutional arrangements (as we now call them), to compensate for 'market failures,' in
order to acquire a socially optimal allocation and distribution. Neo-classical theory does not
offer a good solution to the coordination problem, because this theory has no satisfactory
solution of 'collective action.' Collectivities are assumed to be a mere identity of the
19'representative person,' without differences of interest, information and power.
In institutional economics, the basic premises of neo-classical theory have come under severe
attack. Hodgson, for instance, criticises neo-classical theory on three main points. First, the
assumption of maximising rationality is no longer tenable. In neo-classical theory the agent
is not endowed with choice. The capaciry to change both behaviour and goals without an
external stimulus means that humans have a will. Second, the neo-classical conceptions of
time and equilibrium are incorrect. Economic phenomena are increasingly being seen as both
evolutionary and dynamic. Neo-classical theory has failed to make any significant advance
in understanding long-run technological progress and transformation. Third, neo-classical
theory does not pay attention to the growing recognition of the conceptual significance of
institutions in economic life (Hodgson, 1988: p. 5). Alternatively, Eggertsson argues that three
areas of inquiry have been largely neglected by economists of the neo-classical school:
(1) How do alternative sets of social rules (property rights) and economic organisations
affect behaviour, allocation of resources and equilibrium outcomes?
(2) Why does the form of economic organisations differ from one type of economic activity
to another, even within the same legal framework? In general, what is the economic
logic of various contractual agreements, such as the firm, that are used for organising
production and exchange?
(3) What is the economic logic behind the fundamental social and political rules that
govern production and exchange, and how do these rules change? (Eggertsson, 1990:
p. 4,5).
Institutional economics itself has investigated the problem of coordination more realistically.
According to institutional economists this problem of coordination has to be considered in two
different ways. First, organisations are created to improve the smooth functioning of the
market, the theory often being based on the ideology of (methodological) individualism; and
second, organisations (and~or institutions) are created to encompass 'non-monetary values,'
such as moral values, trust and emotions, which in neoclassical theory are assumed to be part
of the utility function.1e Both organisations and institutions are needed to take up the
The distinction between institutions and organizations is crucial in institutional economic theory. North
argues thal 'like institutions, organizations provide a structure to human interaction. Indeed when we
examine the costs that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework we see they are a result not
only of that framework, but also of the organizations that have developed in consequence of that framework.
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The purpose of the rules
is to define the way the game is played. 8ut the objective of the team within that set of rules is to win that
20coordination of market decisions. They can be seen as mechanisms to solve the problem of
transaction costs, as an improvement of the imperfect markets, or as a means to improve the
social effects of the market, for instance to achieve a just distribution of income.
Coordination of economic actions, thus, can occur via two mechanisms: that of markets and
that of organisations. With respect to the latter, two dimensions must be considered. First, the
dimension of society-wide coordination, through institutional structures like laws, regulations,
fiscal policy and by structured bargaining, and second, the dimension of coordination between
private parties, or between the government and (parts of) the market parties. The theories of
Coase and Williamson deal with coordination between private parties; neo-institutional
theories and theories in the field of social economics deal with the first problem.
Theories and instruments
Theories cover only part of 'reality,' and therefore instruments devised on the basis of these
theories reflect the assumptions and conditions of these theories. For instance, the Pareto
norm in welfare theory is defined within a very strict set of conditions. The 'real world' is much
more complicated than this theory assumes. Can we implement such a norm in practical
policy, even when we know that the 'real world' does not comply with the 'constructed world'
of welfare theory? Does the decision-rule: 'nobody gets a worse situation, and at least one
person improves,' need to be based in welfare theory? Or, is it just a good rule based on
'common sense' or a feeling of 'just distribution'? It could have been based on political science
or philosophy as well.
Neo-classical economics does recognise the need for public policy in a market that is,
temporarily, not perfect. In the case of externalities or lack of information, public policies are
implemented to deal with this. For instance, building land in the Netherlands is seen as a
public good and land development is considered to be a local government task. This is
because land development costs in the Netherlands are high and private developers are
therefore not interested in developing it. Here the choice of an instrument is very appropriately
based on the traditional theory of the behaviour of individual market participants. This
instrument can be applied in situations with a clearly defined market structure and with
opportunities tor measurement of the effects of the policy. In many cases, however, the
relations of cause-effect and the responsibilities of parties are not clearly defined. In such
cases instruments like zoning, or bargaining and institutional arrangements, are used.
game (...)' (North, 1990: p. 5).
21The choice of these kinds of instruments can be defended as being based on the principle of
coordination in new economic theories. An essential element of institutional theory is that
implementing these instruments is not costless - both information and transaction costs are
involved. These information and transaction costs enter into production processes and
supply~demand relations. Neo-classical economics clearly fails to incorporate other costs than
production costs in its conceptual scheme. The question is whether we can make a better
formulation of cases that can be dealt with on the basis of neo-classical theory and those on
the basis of those theories that stress coordination in an environment which is dynamic and
complex, lacking perfect knowledge, mobility and with transaction and information costs, and
not allocation within a given set of conditions. The market can not fulfil all the necessary
functions, if this concept is restricted to perfect markets. We need to add coordination as an
economic problem, apart from allocation.
4.2 Markets and Coordination
A central focus in economics is the market and the functioning of markets. In the neo-
classical approach the emphasis is on decisions and allocation. The market is a useful device
for not only allocation, but also for coordination, but then it has to be complemented with
organisation. This aspect has been receiving attention by various sides, more specifically in
macro-economics, industrial organisation and (new) institutional economics. Coordination
relates to 'purposeful action,' because decisions of economic agents are not only taken in
'closed environments,' but more often than not in dynamic social systems such as markets.
Not only for individuals but for governments as well, this different emphasis on economics can
lead to new viewpoints on choices and strategies.
To work under the aegis of the emphasis on (optimal) allocation requires the knowledge of
explicít preferences and of the available means. For many situations these requirements can
be met, even when the goals and the means are not fully 'given.' More difficulties arise in
situations where the conditions cannot be met. This especially holds true when real time is
decisive: For example, property development may be problematic because of the relatively
long period of time between the start and the completion of a development project. Information
constitutes another problem. Think only of the very considerable uncertainty in assessing
future gain in developing a new building, due to the limited number of transactions in land and
property markets and the fact that there are only a few demanders. Information can be very
22complex for those involved in decision-making. Consequently, decision-makers can adjust
their goals depending on the available means in different situations or time-paths. Besides,
in real life the choice of the goals is interrelated with the availability of ineans. In conventional
theories it is assumed that these two variables are independent of each other. In fact the
variables are often interrelated. Hence, the mathematical optimum of a choice is difficult to find
in a dynamic context.
Moreover, theories and theoretical constructs are being used as normative devices (the
concept of the Pareto-optimum!). In a complex world with incomplete knowledge, there is no
such thing as one Pareto-optimum; there are many of them. Of course, if loosely defined, one
could use that concept as a norm for acquiring a'better' situation for the majority concerned,
but in that case mathematical precision is lacking. The use of such a concept in choosing
policy instruments for any problem including issues related to property market functioning
could be misleading if it were to be used as an exact standard.
Markets are necessary to coordinate individual decisions. Two other possibilities - apart from
markets - for meeting this goal are (central) planning and cooperation, although it would also
be possible to define these alternatives as quasi-markets. To perform this coordination
function, markets need some additional attributes. First, a set of rules with which market
parties should comply, in order to smooth the bargaining and to further the conclusion of
contracts and the transfer of property or user rights; and, second, information about the nature
of the property rights, the quality of the goods or services and the possibility of delivering
within a certain time.
The institutional setting of markets is very important. Markets are structures for exchanging
products and services, or for transferring property or user rights. At the same time, a market
is an information-transmitting structure, relating persons and firms. Property and user rights
are defined socially and their transfer is a social act. Institutions, or systems of rules, relate
the structures of the determination of rights and those of the transfer. In other words, the
institution and the market function inseparably together. There is no strict boundary-line
between markets and the institutional framework.
A theoretical problem is, however, how institutions come about. There are two options: first,
institutions are designed consciously by the participants in the market, or, second, institutions
are inherited from the past. The theory of Williamson focuses on the first one, and emphasizes
the possibility of acquiring an appropriate organisation for a firm in a given market. Many
institutions and organisations are inherited, however, and are imposing conditions on the
23behaviour of inen.79
The fact that economies function within a set of inherited institutions and are strongly
influenced by past decisions on infrastructure, built environment, technologies, education, etc.,
results in many irreversibilities and in the so-called 'path-dependency': the economic system
is affected by the path it has taken in the past. The automatically developing equilibria of neo-
classical theory are 'disturbed' by this phenomenon and by various 'feedback mechanisms.'
Two of the more important feedback relations are those of technology and organisation within
the economy. Heertje (1973) has shown that technology cannot be taken as 'given' for the
functioning of the economic system, but is inherently part of it, as has been recognised more
recently by the new growth theory (M.Scott, 1991)?a The same goes for organisation.
Economic development affects organisation, but organisation has an impact on economics,
as we11.21 Equilibria are disturbed by many kinds of feedback, the price-mechanism is thus
not the only mechanism affecting the functioning of the markets. This conclusion is important
when considering, for instance, the international differences between property market
functioning and differences between sectors of the property market.
An important problem is whether we can, more systematically, investigate the structure of
markets and the need for certain forms of organisation as an alternative mechanism of
coordination, as is developed in the theories of Coase and Williamson. One main problem with
their approach is that they assume a stable environment as given, whereas we would
emphasize the possibilities of unstable, dynamic environments of firms.
Various forms of external conditions for markets exist, depending on factors like turbulence
and dynamism, complexity, feedbacks and stability, the availability of information, the
existence of transaction costs, search costs, distribution costs, and the need to innovate.
In stable environments with standardised products, neo-classical theories can be used quite
effectively. In complex and dynamic environments with highly innovative products, this theory
is insufficient because coordination of the actors on the market cannot be carried out by prices




In Section 4.3 North's explanation for institutional change will be discussed (North, 1990).
New technologies will lead to innovations that, in turn, lower transaction costs. According to North, these
innovations consist of organizational Innovations, instruments, and specific techniques and enforcement
characteristics. 'These innovations occurred at three cost margins: (1) those that increased the mobility of
capítal, (2) those that lowered information costs, and (3) those that spread risk' (North, 1990: p. 125).
North's distinction between institutions (the 'rules') and organizations (the 'players') may be helpful in this
respect the players will try to change the rules (North, 1990; see also Section 4.3).
24that are taken as given by conventional theory. In our view, the chosen theory depends on the
context in which it is used. Ultimately, an economic theory must be used as a'tool,' to explain
the functioning of markets. There is no sense in developing a theory that explains market
functioning in situations that in reality do not exist.
4.3. The Basic Premises of New Institutional Economics
New (and neo-) institutional economic theory has arisen from a dissatisfaction with both the
fundamental shortcomings in neo-classical theory and the lack of explanatory power in
traditional institutional economics. But what then are the basic premises of new institutional
economics? The previous two sub-sections should have made this at least partially clear, but
we will summarise now the theoretical starting points and point out the main fields of interest
in institutional economic theory. At this moment it seems impossible to give a complete outline
of institutional economic theory because there is no agreement about what exactly belongs
to this theoretical tradition. We confine ourselves to a discussion of new institutional
economics, being aware of the fact that there are different versions of new institutional
economics. Here, we follow North's interpretation of new institutional economics (North,
1990) zz
Although there is certainly no widespread agreement between institutional economists, all
authors have adopted Coase's argument that 'when it is costly to transact, institutions matter'
(Coase, 1937). Transaction costs arise because of the complexity and dynamism of
environments and the costliness of information. Questions of information and knowledge are
vital to institutional economics.
Eggertsson defines transaction costs as 'the costs that arise when individuals exchange
ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights' (Eggertsson, 1990: p.
14). The concepts of information costs and transaction costs are not identical. As Eggertsson
argues, 'a lonely person on a desert island will encounter information costs as he goes about
his "home production," but an isolated individual does not engage in exchange and therefore
will have no transaction costs. (...) When information is costly, various activities related to the
exchange of property rights between individuals give rise to transaction costs' (Eggertsson,
:z
Note that his approach does not necessarily represent the entire field of interest of new institutional
economic theory. At this moment, a general theory in institutional economic theory does not exist. What
institutionai approaches do have in common is the rejection of certain assumptions in mainstream neo-
classical theory.
251990: p. 14). Transaction costs consist of 'the costs of ineasuring the valuable attributes of
what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing
agreements' (North, 1990: p. 27). This includes the following activities:
(1) The search for information about the distribution of price and quality of
commodities and labour inputs, and the search for potential buyers and sellers
and for relevant information about their behaviour and circumstances;
(2) The bargaining that is needed to find the true position of buyers and sellers
when prices are endogenous;
(3) The making of contracts;
(4) The monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they abide by the terms
of the contract;
(5) The enforcement of a contract and the collection of damages when partners fail
to observe their contractual obligations;
(6) The protection of property rights against third-party encroachment - for
example, protection against pirates or even against the government in the case
of illegitimate trade (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 15).
In Williamson's transaction cost approach, the fundamental unit of analysis is the transaction.
'Transactions can take place across markets or within organisations. Whether a particular
transaction is allocated to the market or to an organisation is a matter of cost minimization'
(Douma and Schreuder, 1992: p. 102). Transaction cost economics is based on two
assumptions about human behaviour. First, human beings are boundedly rational; the
knowledge of the decision-maker is severely limited. This will pose a problem in an
environment that is characterised by uncertainty and complexity. North argues that:
'it (the concepts of bounded rationality - EvdFt~JL) brings into play the complexity and
incompleteness of our information and the fumbling efforts we make to decipher it. It
focuses on the need to develop regularized patterns ofhuman interactions in the face
of such complexities and it suggests that these regularized interactions we call
institutions may be very inadequate or very far from optima! in any sense of the term'
(North, 1990: p. 23).
Second, human beings sometimes display opportunistic behaviour. Not everybody behaves
opportunistically, but some people do, and it is difficult or costly to tell ex ante whether they
will or not. The following example makes this clear. When someone sells his house to a
certain person, he can never be sure ex ante if this person will actually buy the house. For
26this reason, he wants him to sign a contract. Contrarily, the person who wants to buy the
house doesn't know if the seller tells the truth about the quality of the house. Therefore, he
will ask an expert to inspect the house before he decides to buy it. Opportunistic behaviour
is problematic only if it occurs in conjunction with small numbers of trading partners. 'If there
is only one seller he does not have to worry over his reputation, because you do not have an
alternative. In this case you want to have (the product) inspected, so you have to pay
transaction costs' (Douma and Schreuder, 1992: p. 106).
These two particular aspects of human behaviour point out the significance of uncertainty in
explaining human actions. 'These uncertainties arise as a consequence of both the complexity
of the problems to be solved and the problem-solving software (...) possessed by the
individual' (North: p. 25). In this context we must consider the role of institutions; they are
meant to reduce the uncertainties involved in human interaction.
'Institutions provide the structure for exchange that (together with the technology
employed) determines the cost of transacting and the cost of transformation. How well
institutions solve the problems of coordination and production is determined by the
motivation of fhe players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment, and
the ability of the players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and
enforcement)' (North: p. 34).
The latter forms the basis for North's explanation of institutional change and the existence of
considerable differences between economies (see below).
The institutions that are necessary to accomplish economic exchange vary in their complexity.
North distinguishes informal constraints, formal rules and third-party enforcement. Informal
constraints (like taboos, customs, and traditions) are part of the culture that underlies society.
They consist of (1) extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, (2) socially
sanctioned norms of behaviour, and (3) internally enforced standards of conduct. Two aspects
of informal constraints are particularly noteworthing: they play an important role in the
incremental way in which institutions evolve (because most cultural changes are typically
incremental), and they are culturally derived, they will not change immediately in reaction to
changes in the formal rules. They slow down the process of change.
Formal rules include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts. Political rules
'define the hierarchical structure of the polity, its basic decision structure, and the explicit
characteristics of agenda control' (ibid., p. 47). Economic rules 'deiine property rights, that is
the bundle of rights over the use and the income to be derived from property and the ability
27to alienate an asset or a resource.' Contracts 'contain the provisions specific to a particular
agreement in exchange' (ibid., p. 47).
Third-party enforcement would involve, in principle, 'a neutral party with the ability, costlessly,
to eniorce agreements such that the offending party always had to compensate the injured
party to a degree that made it costly to violate the contracts' (p. 58). This implies 'the
development of the state as a coercive force able to monitor property rights and enforce
contracts effectively' (ibid., p. 59).
The above reproduces the basic elements of North's theoretical concept. These elements can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The institutional constraints that define the opportunity set of individuals are a
complex of formal and informal constraints. Institutions are stable, because a
large number of specific constraints affect a particular choice and institutional
changes involve a host of changes in a variety of constraints. At the same
time, the complex of informal and formal constraints makes possible continual
incremental changes at particular margins.
(2) , The complex of institutional constraints will result in various mixes of formal
and informal constraints which, in turn, reflect costliness of ineasurement and
enforcement. Self-enforcing contracts will dominate forms of exchange,
although there is the recognition of the limitations that necessarily obtain when
third-party enforcement is not possible.
(3) Transaction costs are the most observable dimension of the institutional
framework that underlies the constraints in exchange.
(4) The institutional framework plays a major role in the performance of an
economy. However, some institutional constraints raise transaction costs.
Therefore, the market, overall, is a mixed bag of institutions; some increase
efficiency and some decrease efficiency (ibid., pp. 67-69).
Institutional change
North intends to develop a theory of institutional change. His primary objective is to achieve
an understanding of the differential performances of economies through time. He argues that
'separating the analysis of the underlying rules from the strategy of the players is a necessary
prerequisite to building a theory of institutions' (ibid., p. 5). The difference between institutions
and organisations and the interaction between them shape the direction of institutional change.
28'Institutions, together with the standard constraints ofeconomic theory, determine the
opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those
opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions' (ibid., p. 7).
This institutional change is incremental in form and 'comes from the perceptions of the
entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the
existing institutional framework at some margin. But the perceptions crucially depend on both
the information that the entrepreneurs receive and the way they process that information'
(ibid., p. 8). Because to acquire information is not costless, these perceptions do not always
result in efficient choices. That is, North does not want to suggest that institutional change will
always lead to a more efficiently functioning economy. Certainly, important differences
between economies can be noted.
To understand the processes underlying institutional change we must take into account the
way institutional constraints shape organisations and their objectives and the kinds of
knowledge and skills that will be acquired by the organisation to further its objectives - as this
plays a major role in the way the stock of knowledge evolves and is used. With respect to the
first point, North emphasizes that (1) the institutional framework will shape the direction of the
acquisition of knowledge and skills and (2) that direction will be the decisive factor for the
long-run development of a society. For example:
'if the basic institutional framework makes income redistribution (...) the preferred (...)
economic opportunity, we can expect a very different development of knowledge and
skills than a productivity-increasing (...) economic opportunity would entail. (..) The
incentives that are built into the insfitufional framework play the decisive role in shaping
the kinds of skills and knowledge that pay off' (ibid., p. 78).
With respect to the second point it is argued by North that maximising behaviour of economic
organisations - the main incentive - shapes institutional change in three different ways: (1)
the resultant derived demand for investment in knowledge of all kinds; (2) the ongoing
interaction between organised economic activity, the stock of knowledge, and the institutional
framework; and (3) incremental alteration of the informal constraints as a by-product of
maximising activities of organisations.23
The interactíon of organisations and institutions has implications for the performance of
Note that maximizing behaviour is just one of the different types of behaviour that economic organizations
show. Other types of behaviour - for instance, doing charitable work - will result in another path of
institutional change.
29economies over time. In exploring this interaction, North introduces the term adaptive
efficiency (as opposed to neo-classical allocative efficiency):
Adapfive efficiency (...) ís concerned with the kinds of rules that shape th~.lyay an
economy evolves through time (...). It is also concerned with the willingness of a
sociery to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and
creative activity of alt sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the
sociery through time' (ibid., p. 80).
Although our knowledge of all the aspects of what makes for adaptive efficiency is still limited,
it is clear, according to North, that 'the overall institutional structure plays the key role in the
degree that the society and the economy will encourage the trials, experiments, and
innovations that we can characterise as adaptively efficient' (ibid., p. 81). Crucial to effective
organisation are competition, decentralized decision making, and well-specified contracts of
property rights as well as bankruptcy laws. Besides, 'it is essential to have rules that eliminate
not only failed economic organization but failed political organization as well' (ibid., p. 81).
As was mentioned above, in North's theoretical concept institutional change is believed to take
place only incrementally; the institutional framework is stable. This stability is accomplished
by a complex set of constraints that include formal rules and informal constraints. The most
important sources of institutional change are fundamental changes in relative prices, such as
changes in the ratio of factor prices (i.e., changes in the ratio of capital to land), changes in
the cost of information (i.e., the process by which the entrepreneur acquires skills and
knowledge changes perceived costs of ineasurement and enforcement), and changes in
technology.
We know very little about the sources of changing preferences or tastes. North points out that
'it is obvious that the cultural characteristics of a society change over time and that accidents,
learning, and natural selection all play a part' (ibid., p. 87). Nevertheless, essential to North's
argument is that these cultural changes take place at a different rate than that characterising
the changing of formal rules. '(A) major role of informal constraints is to modify, supplement,
or extend formal rules' (ibid., p. 87). Therefore, changes in formal rules will in general be
'weakened' by the norms and values underlying a society. 'Although a wholesale change in
the formal rules may take place, at the same time there will be many informal constraints that
have great survival tenacity because they still resolve basic exchange problems among the
participants, be they social, political, or economic' (ibid., p. 91). As a result, the overall
institutional framework is characteristically stable.
30Path dependency
Having demonstrated that institutional change takes place incrementally, North then turns to
exploring the path dependency of institutional change: history matters! Two forces shape the
path of institutional change: increasing returns and imperfect markets characterised by
significant transaction costs. Similar to technological change, increasing returns as a result of
institutional change occur because of four self reinforcing mechanisms:
(1) there will be large setup costs when the institutions are created, which give the
advantage of falling costs once the institutions are functioning smoothly;
(2) significant learning effects for organisations that arise in consequence of the
opportunity set provided by the institutional framework;
(3) there will be coordination effects directly via contracts with other organisations
and indirectly by induced investment through the polity in complementary
activities. The formal rules will result in the creation of a variety of informal
constraints that modify the formal rules and extend them to a variety of specific
applications;
(4) adaptive expectations occur because increased prevalence of contracting on
a specific institution will reduce uncertainties about the permanence of that rule
(ibid., p. 95).
Besides, the long-run path of economies is shaped by the fact that markets are imperfect and
therefore give rise to significant transaction costs. In an imperfect market the information
feedback is fragmentary; 'then the subjective models of actors modified both by very imperfect
feedback and by ideology will shape the path' (ibid., p. 95). This allows for an explanation as
to why economies have evolved along different lines. The self reinforcing mechanisms make
clear why institutions matter. When there are no increasing returns and markets are
competitive, institutions do not matter: 'if (...) the actors initially have incorrect models and act
upon them, they either will be eliminated or efficient information feedback will induce them to
modify their models' (ibid., p. 95). Economic growth depends on the extent to which these
mechanisms take place in the institutional context. A fundamental change in relative prices
(see above) affects two societies differently, because
'in each society the change will result in adaptations at the margins, and the margins
atfected will be those where the immediate issues require solution and the solution will
be determined by the relative bargaining power of the participants - that is, the
organizations that have evolved in the specific overall institutional context. (...)
Because the bargaining power of groups in one society will clearly differ from that in
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Moreover, with different past histories and incompfete feedback on the consequences,
the actors will have different subjective models and therefore make different policy
choices' (ibid., p. 101).
Path dependency is, according to North, the key to an analytical understanding of long-run
economic change. 'The source of incremental change is the gains to be obtained by
organizations and their entrepreneurs from acquiring skills, knowledge, and information that
will enhance their objectives. Path dependence comes from the increasing returns
mechanisms that reinforce the direction once given a path' (ibid., p. 112).
Fundamental to North's approach is that he stays close to neo-classical theory. He adopts
both neo-classical models' focus on microlevel economic activity (methodological
individualism), and - according to him - the most constructive building blocks of these models:
both the scarcity~competition postulate and incentives as the driving force (wealth
maximalization - EvdIVJL). This theory, however, should be modified 'by incorporating
incomplete information and subjective models of reality and the increasing returns
characteristic of institutions. The result is an approach that offers the promise of connecting
microlevel economic activity with macrolevel incentives provided bythe institutional framework'
(ibid., p. 112).
North summarizes the consequences of institutions for contemporary economic analysis as
fol lows:
(1) Economic models are specific to particular constellations of institutional
constraints that vary radically both through time and cross sectionally in
different economies. Moreover, the specific institutional constraints dictate the
margins at which organisations operate and hence make intelligible the
interplay between the rules of the game and the behaviour of the actors.
(2) An incorporation of institutions will force social scientists in general, and
economists in particular, to question the behaviourial models that underlie their
disciplines and, in consequence, to explore the implications of the costly and
imperfect processing of information for the consequent behaviour of the actors.
(3) Ideas and ideologies matter, and institutions play a major role in determining
just how much they matter. Formal institutions affect the price individuals pay
for their actions. A key consequence of formal institutions is mechanisms, like
voting systems in democracies or organisational structures in hierarchies, that
32enable individuals who are agents to express their own views.
(4) The polity and the economy are inextricably interlinked in any understanding
of the performance of an economy. A set of institutional constraints defines the
exchange relationships between the two and therefore determines the way a
political~economic system works.
In conclusion, North's theoretical framework is built upon the following definition of institutions:
'(they) provide the basic structure by which human beings throughout history have
created order and attempted to reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the
technology employed, they determine transaction and transformation costs and hence
the profitability and feasibility of engaging ïn economic activity. (...) And they are the
key to understanding the interrelationship between the polity and the economy and the
consequences of that interrelationship for economic growth (orstagnation anddecline)'
(ibid., p. 118).
We started this section with the statement that North's work belongs to the field of 'new
institutional economics' because of its focus on coordination between private parties, or
between the government and (parts of) the market parties. From North's point of view,
organisations are created to improve the smooth functioning of the market. Nevertheless,
North's institutional theory is much more sophisticated than are the classical transaction cost
approaches of either Coase or Williamson, because North takes into account, among other
things, the important role of technology in an economy and the meaning of institutional
change, holding a more dynamic conception of the economy.
In essence, the main difference between Williamson's approach and North's approach is the
interpretation of the meaning of institutions in a society. Williamson argues that institutions are
created only to reduce transaction costs: a choice between markets and organisations. North
nuances this assumption and holds a broader - but still restricted to the economic system -
view of the institutional context. He claims, more in accordance with reality, that institutions
are created to reduce the uncertainty that is characteristic to human behaviour. The
institutional framework is meant to reduce the complexity that surrounds demandlsupply
relations; sometimes this will reduce transaction costs, sometimes it raises transaction costs.
In most modern neo-classical work the institutional context is indeed recognised, but not
endogenised in the theoretical concept. However, it is not our intention to demonstrate here
the shortcomings of neo-classical theory: we won't fall into the trap of criticizing neo-classical
33economics without offering a better approach - a crime of which neo-classical economists
often rightly accuse their opponents. On the contrary, we will focus on the "better approach.'
We will now turn to what is the main objective of this study, namely developing a model of the
property development process based on institutional theory.
345. APPLYING INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY TO THE STUDY OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
The optimal model of the development process should give us answers to questions like: (1)
why does a certain development take place on a particular location at a particular time?; (2)
why does the number of these developments change over time and how can differences in
development between locations be explained?; and (3) who are the actors involved in property
development? The urban property market is considered to be a special rype of market. This
is, among other things, because of the heterogeneity of the groups of actors that are involved
in the development process, and because of the special characteristics of land and buildings
as a product: it is relatively expensive, durable, localized - and therefore every product is
unique, the market is divided in different sub-sectors which are separated from each other,
and the markets for new buildings and second-hand buildings are closely interlinked. This
section will discuss first the driving forces. What does institutional theory tell us about
- demand~supply relations; how do they vary under different conditions?
- the meaning of the institutional context and institutional differences;
- the meaning of local government policy (i.e., acting as a constraint or
stimulating market functions);
- market and social imperfections;
- the element of time; static or dynamic (i.e., institutional change, technological
change)?
Second, these driving forces must be translated into hypotheses. The hypotheses should
relate to the following questions:
- What structures the development industry?;
- What structures land and property markets?;
- What kind of relations exist between property development and (local)
economic development (the demand for buildings)?;
- What is the significance of variations in the organisation of the development
industry and the characteristics of land and property markets?;
- What are the consequences of such variations for the production of the built
environment and who benefits from this?;
- Which market and social imperfections could possibly constrain property
development?
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- What kind of strategies may be expected of government bodies to improve the
functioning of the market and to deal with unwanted effects of the functioning
of markets (and what will be the outcome of these strategies?);
- What kind of strategies may be expected of other groups of actors operating
on the market to take advantage of the way the market functions and of the
way the government structures this (and what will be the outcome of these
strategies?);
- What kind of differences may be expected between a well functioning property
market and a poorly functioning property market (the amount and type of new
developments, property values, agents involved in the development process,
kind of institutional relations?); and
- How does the development industry respond to (changes in) economic growth
and to restructuring processes taking place on the demand side.
(In the next section we will focus on market imperfections and market failures and see to what
extent they occur on urban property markets.)
5,1 Driving Forces
Demand~supply relations
Fundamental to North's approach is that it is built upon the belief that an analysis of markets
must focus on micro level economic activity. However, the individual behaviour of agents and
the outcome of market mechanisms is influenced by the fact that, on the one hand, agents
dispose of both incomplete information and subjective models of reality and, on the other
hand, that institutions are characterised by an increasing returns mechanism. The extent to
which this increasing returns mechanism takes place defines respectively the constraints and
incentives built in the institutional framework for the individual behaviour of agents.
A study of demand~supply relations between actors involved in the property development
process should start from the point that the individual agents behave boundedly rational and
sometimes display opportunistic behaviour. Because in a complex situation the knowledge of
the decision-maker is severely limited and because we can never be sure if a person will
actually do what he tells us he will do, demand~supply relations are typically problematic, and
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situations. For instance, an estate agent is called in to search for potential buyers and sellers
for a house or an office building, while a surveyor has to assess the value of the property.
Because of the possibility of opportunistic behaviour both the buyer and the seller bring in a
surveyor. Second, because on a property market characteristically no homogeneous products
are sold, bargaining is needed to find the true position of buyers and sellers. Third, although
in many cases standard contracts are used when property is sold, considerable costs are
involved, for example because a notary must formally draw up the contract (in the Netherlands
they charge a standard percentage of the purchase price). Fourth, transaction costs are
involved with the enforcement of a contract when partners fail to observe their contractual
obligations. Moreover, because of the special characteristics of property - relatively high costs
are involved with purchasing a property - other transaction costs will rise as well, rental costs
in particular. Information costs are connected with the uncertainty about future gain in property
development processes. In fact, this aspect makes the real estate market imperfect bynature
(see Houghton, 1993): the uncertainty will never disappear.
Perhaps the most striking example of the complexity of property markets is the important role
of property developers in this market. The main task of property developers is to 'organise' the
development process: to bring buyers and sellers in contact with each other, to find a building
plot, to find a financial institution who is willing to invest in the development, etc. There is
probably no other market in which intermediaries play such a decisive role in the production
process!
By using the term 'problematic' with respect to demandlsupply relations, it is not suggested
that this will inevitably lead to market failure. After all, institutions and organisations are
created to deal with imperfect market conditions. How well institutions and organisations solve
the problems of coordination depends, according to North, on the motivation of the players,
the complexity of the environment, and the ability of the players to decipher and order the
environment.
If we want to understand why demandlsupply relations vary under different conditions, the
attention should be focused on differences in the institutional context. For instance, informal
constraints may vary in different local property markets. The kind of relations that exist
between property developers, building companies and a municipality may be responsible for
the fact that a public private partnership is established in order to redevelop an inner-city
area. Note that we do not suggest that the institutional context defines the level of demand;
37rather, it defines only the relations between demand-side and supply-side actors. However,
when these relations are problematic, this may also affect the level of demand: supply-side
constraints appear (this will be discussed below).
The institutional context
The institutional context plays a major role in shaping the outcome of market processes.
Institutions are responsible for variations in market functioning and for the problems that
sometimes occur with respect to the outcome of market processes (i.e. unwanted side-effects,
supply doesn't come forward). In Section Four several aspects of institutional relations that
matter in this respect are mentioned. First, the institutions that are necessary to accomplish
economic exchange vary in their complexity: informal constraints, formal rules and third-party
enforcement. The mix of these institutions is responsible for the functioning of an economy
and differences in this mix of institutions explain partially why national economies do not
operate similarly. This distinction in institutions' complexity may be helpful in understanding
why the outcome of properry development processes in different countries is not always
similar; however, it is not clear if it will help us to find out why local property markets in the
same country sometimes operate differently. In general, it may be assumed that the impact
of formal rules and third-party enforcement is equal in any location within a national economy.
Second, institutions determine the opportunities in a society; organisations are created to take
advantage of those opportunities. Moreover, North argues that the incentives that are built into
the institutional framework shape the direction of the acquisition of knowledge and skills by
organisations and he maintains that this is the decisive factor for the fong-run development
of a society. Obviously, this argument is helpful in comparing, for instance, a West-european
economy with an East-european or Third-world economy - although one might argue that
this is a rather oversimplified pronouncement, since in the world economy power relations play
a very significant role - but indirectly it does tell us something about local economies as well.
Both formal rules and informal constraints enable, in a way, firms and households to choose
for themselves where they want to be situated. As a result, the level of economic growth in
urban regions varies considerably (the result would be different if the central government were
to decide where new industries must be established). Formal rules also give municipalities the
opportunity and the instruments to carry out their own spatial-economic polícy. Sometimes,
this attracts new firms and sometimes it just holds back firms from establishing themselves
in a certain town (i.e., because in zoning plans lucrative locations are reserved for other
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acquisition of knowledge and skills enables the development of new technologies, new
methods of ineasurement, etc. This may influence both the type of demand for new buildings
(since the production methods of the users of the buildings are changed) and building
construction methods. And because of this, developments in one area may become more
profitable than in another area (for instance, when high-tech companies prefer to be located
in each other's proximity); relations between developers and construction firms may be
changed (in the Netherlands, for example, developers often originate from banks); the period
of time that is necessary to complete the construction of a new building may be shortened,
and so on (see below, 'institutional and technological change').
~Third, institutions are created to reduce the problems of coordination that arise because of the
uncertainry and the lack of information inherent to all human behaviour. Not all institutions
increase efficiency and reduce transaction costs; some institutional constraints raise
transaction costs and decrease efficiency. Examples of the latter include institutions that
provide barriers to monopoly production, or the fact that municipalities sometimes prevent
developers from building commercial property speculatively (this is often the case in the
Netherlands).
Fourth, crucial to North's theoretical concept is the assumption that the constellations of
institutional constraints in economies vary radically both through time and cross-sectionally
in different economies. He argues that this institutional change is incremental in form and
comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and economic organisations that
they could do better by altering the existing institutional framework at some margin. The
entrepreneurs are thus the key players that bring about changes in the institutional framework.
Because their perceptions depend on the information they perceive and because this
information is not costless, their choices - which are mainly based on a maximising behaviour
perception - will not always be efficient ones. On urban property markets, local governments
especially and the property development industry itself are responsible for institutional
changes. For example, in the Netherlands during the 1980s, bad performances of financial
institutions with respect to investments in real estate have brought some of them to the
decision to sell their assets to property investment companies and to buy instead shares in
these companies. Again in the 1980s, local governments have changed their policies in a
more entrepreneurial style, resulting in, among other things, more financially independent
39operating municipal departments and public private partnerships with developers, building
companies and financial institutions.
The most important source of institutional change is fundamental change in relative prices.
North distinguishes changes in the ratio of factor prices (i.e., the ratio of building costs to land
development costs), changes in the cost of information (i.e., in a historical context, the fact
that office space became a more or less standardised product for office users reduced
developers' uncertainty about the demand for office space enormously and cleared the way
for the introduction of a market for commercial property), and changes in technology (i.e., in
the last fifteen or twenty years the period of time needed for the construction of office buildings
has roughly been halved).
When institutional change takes place, self re-inforcing mechanisms will bring fonrvard
increasing returns. However, this change is shaped by imperfect market conditions,
characterised by significant transaction costs. These imperfect market conditions, in a society
as a whole or in a sector of the economy, define how changes in the institutional framework
affect a sociery or a separate sector of the economy.
Local government policy
Local authorities are, as a political organisation, part of the institutional context. In fact they
play a double role. On the one hand they act within the margins that formal rules and the
poliry offer them. In North's concept, they are considered, together with the economic
organisations, as "the players" in the economy. On the other hand, they are part of the poliry.
In this role they protect formal rules. Sometimes they stimulate market functions by reducing
uncertainry and by solving the problems that are caused by the uncertainty that defines to a
larger or lesser extent the strategies of market parties. An example of the former policy is that
local authorities in the Netherlands act as land developers; an example of the latter policy is
that they are very active in attracting new firms to their city by, among other things, removing
supply-side constraints. Although local authorities in general favour economic development,
they sometimes apply constraints to economic developments as well, when, for instance, they
allocate land for social housing.
In recent years, the internal organisation of municipalities has changed substantially. Municipal
departments operate now as separate business units with responsibiliry for their own budgets.
Because of this, financial considerations (budget control) have increasingly been the decisive
,,
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municipal system. For example, departments become each other's competitors when they try
to maximise their yields. The sale of land for free sector houses brings in larger revenues than
social housing projects. Therefore, housing corparations, which have traditionally been
responsible for social housing production, now prefer to develop projects that are a
combination of both social housing and free sector houses. Seeking compensation for the low
revenues from social housing development, they negotiate with private developers to carry out
such projects jointly. In this way, they poach on the land department's territory, since the land
departments have traditionally developed and sold the land for free séctor houses. The private
developers can play off the land department against the housing corporations, probably
resulting in lower land prices. Note that in the context of the Dutch administrative relationships,
the political system (i.e. the alderman for housing!) ultimately defines how the competition
between the land department and the housing associations evolves, since in the political
system the housing contingents are assigned to each of them.
Another example shows, contrarily, that in other situations the competitive position of land
departments in relation to private developers improves. Traditionally, in many municipalities
land departments usually negotiate with only one private developer about the development of,
for instance, a free sector housing scheme. Now, increasingly a competitive element seems
to be introduced. Land departments ask several private developers to make a bid for the
buiiding land and to calculate the development costs; this may result in higher land prices.
The above is not a blue print of the state of affairs in Dutch municipalities. However, it
characterises the changing role of municipalities on urban real estate markets and the way
in which this can influence market and price mechanisms.
Market and social imperfections
Market imperfections are the result of both the limited information that is at the market parties'
disposal and the complexity of the market itself; this affects demand~supply relations. From
North's point of view, it follows that institutions are more or less 'automatically' created to solve
the imperfections that are linked to the uncertainty that underlies market processes. However,
the individual agents create the instítutions and, as we have discussed above, this is based
on their perceptions about market functioning and the institutional framework. The perceptions,
in turn, depend on the information that they receive and the way they process that information;
it may thus be expected that institutions will sometimes evolve that are not perfect, either. In
41the new-institutional-economics concept, market imperfections are not considered to be
structural. They exist either because the right institutions to deal with them have not yet been
created, or because the institutional change was imperfect itself (because of the limited
information of the agents who are responsible for this change). In both cases it is assumed
that in the end the market imperfection can be solved, although it is not predicted when and
under what circumstances this will happen?" We do not share this opinion. In our view,
imperfect market conditions are a common phenomenon to all property markets. However,
imperfect market conditions must be clearly distinguished from market failure. Imperfect
market conditions do not necessarily result in either a shortage of supply or an oyersupply (in
these two cases we speak of market failure).
Social imperfections are defined here as unwanted side-etfects of market processes. For
instance, the activities of one social group harm another social group. In new institutional
economics, no explicit attention is paid to these kinds of imperfections. However, we will
incorporate them in the concept of market failure that is developed in Section 6.
Dynamics related to property development processes
A crucial distinction between North's approach and Williamson's standard new institutional
economics is the way they focus on the element of time in economic models. Contrary to
Williamson, North places the way economies evolve through time in the centre of his analysis.
The dynamics of property development are clearly visible in the massive growth of investment
demand for property during the second half of the 1980s. The property boom has been
facilitated by the availability of finance (especially of influence in the residential sector) and
the enormous growth of investments in real estate by financial institutions, such as pension
funds, investment and insurance companies (affecting the office and retail sector).
The combined influence of institutional and technological change is held responsible for the
dynamics in a society (which explains why institutional and evolutionary theories are strongly
related). We have already argued how institutional change takes place; the self re-inforcing
mechanisms that are characteristic to the process of institutional change are also valid with
respect to technological change.
Examples of institutional change include the changing role of municipalities in property
za
We must make a distinction here between the new-institutional-economics concept and North's theoretical
concept. North seems to give a more "structural" meaning to institutional inefficiency than standard new
institutional economics does. In North's theory the term 'path dependency' i~ used to indicate why
institutional change does not always contribute to more efficiëricy. Although he does not call it structural,
in a way this path dependency is sort of a structural explanation for inefficient institutions and, as a
consequence, possible market imperfections.
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projects, the globalisation of finance capital (foreign investors now invest in commercial
property in Dutch cities), the evolution of new forms of financing real estate development, the
change of government policy with respect to the location of new business sites away from high
way locations to the promotion of locations near public transport junctions, the increasing
notice that is taken of environmental problems, etc. The latter results in, among other things,
stronger environmental demands with respect to building methods, soil conditions, etc. These
examples make clear that institutional change does not always favour the smooth functioning
of properry markets!
Examples of technological change that are relevant to urban property market functioning are
new building techniques (the time that is needed for construction of new buildings has
decreased, a new type of temporary office buildings are now constructed), innovations with
respect to telecommunications, transport and production methods (both are examples of
processes that restructure the demand for buildings), new computerised real estate valuation
methods (reducing the uncertainty with respect to property values).
These institutional and technological innovations, together with the increased demand for real
estate as a result of economic growth, have been responsible for a dramatic change in
property development processes and, particularly, in the outcome of property development
processes. What is perhaps most striking is that cities now seem to be dominated by office
developments - near railway stations, in business parks near motorways, in the historic town
centres, as a part of redevelopment schemes - while previously the town centres, including
the shopping centres, were the dominant part of the cities. At the same moment, one gets the
idea that the character and function of these business parks are much more temporarily. In
twenty years (or even shorter) they will probably have disappeared and been replaced by new,
more modern buildings, probably on other locations as well.
5.2 Shortcomings in North's theory of insfitutional change
North's institutional framework is useful for the purpose of this paper because it enables us
to identify the driving forces behind economic processes, and to explain how the institutional
context shapes these processes and the way this institutional context is continually changed.
Moreover, we are now able to unravel the relevance of the institutional context for the
functioning of urban property markets. It still, however, leaves us with some problems.
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characteristic to urban property markets, North's theoretical concept should be preferred above
a neo-classical model and also above a model based on standard new institutional
economics. Compared to neo-classical and transaction-cost models, it offers a better
framework to analyze market processes, explaining not only supply~demand relations, but also
the way the institutional context shapes these relations. Besides, it provides us with a much
more detailed explanation for why supply~demand relations are characteristically imperfect -
this line of argument will be further developed in Section Six -, and for the way an economy
evolves through time. Nevertheless, when we apply North's concept to the functioning of urban
property markets we face three major problems.
First, in his approach to institutions North focuses on the functioning of national economies
and he explains why national economies evolve along different lines. We are primarily
concerned with investigating property development processes taking place within local
economies. It might well be that the mixed set of institutions on a national scale and the
incentives that are built in this national institutional framework also explain market mechanisms
on a local scale, but the link between the national economy and a local economy is not made
clear. In this respect two different lines of argument are conceivable. On the one hand, it might
be argued that both on a national and on a local scale identical processes drive the economy.
The strategies of the agents in the market processes, characterised by uncertainty and shaped
by the institutional framework, are the driving forces behind development processes. This
functions as our guideline to a better understanding of these market processes. Differences
between local economies can be understood by focusing on the incentives that are built into
the institutional framework and the perceptions of the agents involved in the development
process. When we assume that the ry~ain incentive is profit maximisation, then developments
take place on the location that is most preferred by a firm (or household) given a set of limiting
conditions. The institutional framework might slightly vary in local economies, mainly due to
differences in informal constraints and - as far as local authorities are able to set formal rules
- to differences in formal rules as well. However, the question if local economies will evolve
along different lines remains unanswered. In fact, according to this line of argument, in a local
economy the institutional context is seen as a given structure and not explicitly as part of the
analysis.
On the other hand, it might be argued that local institutional relations are much more
significant. But then we wonder if North's approach to the problem is sufficiently profound. In
this case we need to know more about the nexus of institutional relationships within a local
44economy in general, and within the property development industry in particular; these
relationships cannot entirely be reduced to economic relationships. We do not intend to
elaborate on this problem here; elsewhere we will discuss if other theoretical approaches
provide us with a method to investigate aspects of local institutional relationships other than
purely economic ones.
Second, in North's theory of institutional change the role of local government policy is not
mentioned at all. Above, we have seen that the way local governments operate on the market
directly influences market conditions. Sometimes the municipaliry thwarts new development
plans; in other situations market processes are encouraged. A close study of local government
policy and its effects on urban property markets is necessary in order to find out in which ways
municipalities can structure property market functioning.
Note that it is not suggested here that North's theory should not be useful in analyzing
development processes in urban property markets; rather, we think that more evidence is
needed regarding the meaning of differences in the nexus of local institutional relationships.
This brings us to the third problem. North has not developed a method to operationalise his
theoretical concept and this is necessary in order to test his theory of institutional change. It
proves to be difficult to find empirical evidence for the assumptions that are made in
institutional theories, due to the complexity of the markets with which they try to deal. In this
study, however, we are not concerned with testing the assumptions; these are taken as a
starting point. This paper aims to add to a better understanding of the complexity and
dynamics of urban real estate markets. Institutional theory is preferred above neo-classical
theory, because it explains these market aspects, while neo-classical theory, on the contrary,
abstracts from them.
5.3 Operationalisation of the model
The remaining part of this section is devoted to issues concerning the organisation of the
development industry, the way urban property markets function, the relation between urban
property market functioning and the local economy, and the consequences of the outcome of
property development processes for the urban spatial structure. We intend to operationalise
institutional theory into hypotheses about the strategies of market parties and the meaning of
institutional relations in the property development industry.
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The strategies of the actors that take part in the development industry are, in principle, based
on maximising behaviour. However, the actors' ability to choose a strategy that will bring them
a maximum result is limited because their knowledge of the complex environment is
incomplete (they behave boundedly rational). Their strategies are also influenced by the fact
that human beings sometimes display opportunistic behaviour.
Several organisations operate on property markets, primarily because of the uncertainry that
is characteristic to properry development processes. These intermediate agents, like
developers and real estate agents, in principle increase efficiency and reduce information
costs (if they wouldn't have been active on the market, information costs would have been
higher). The intermediate agents display maximising behaviour themselves (and behave
boundedly rational as well). As a result, they sometimes try to change the institutional
framework in their favour, their activities not always serving to increase efficiency and reduce
transaction costsllProperty developers, for instance, act boundedly rational: their strategies
are out of necessity based on a short-term perception of the economy, in general, and the
real estate market, in particular. This may lead to an oversupply of commercial property, since
developers do not know how the demand for office buildings will evolve in the long term. In
abstract terms, the motivation of the players, the complexity of the environment and the ability
of the players to decipher and order their environment structure the outcome of development
processes.
We next turn to the strategies of property developers, financial institutions, the final users of
the buildings, and the municipalities, which all possess a prominent position in an urban
economy.
With respect to commercial properry, property developers take a central position in the
development process. Their strategies are, of course, based on the principle of profit making;
more precisely, making profits by developing buildings and selling them to either the final
users or financial institutions. This principle is usually not valid for companies developing a
new building for their own use - the general procedure on the industrial property market in the
Netherlands. ln this case, the building costs are part of the production costs. The dríving force
behind the strategies of these companies is primarily based on making profits out of the sale
of the goods that are produced in the new building. The development of the building itself
does not necessarily have to be profitable.
The consequences of these differences can be more drastic than might be expected at first
46sight. For it follows from this that property developers are interested only in developing
projects that they expect to sell easily. This implies that they prefer to develop standardised
buildings - for which there is a large and ready market - on top locations, unless the building
is sold before they start developing it. The market behaviour of property developers may
cause two different problems. On the one hand, when there is a shortage of high-quality
locations in an urban region, new building developments sometimes do not come forward,
and, on the other hand, their behaviour can easily lead to an over-supply of office buildings.
After all, property developers are primarily interested in selling their own projects. In the short
term it does not harm them if this leads to vacancies in the existing building stock - although
they will realise that in the long run this will affect property prices. And when they do care,
they can't do anything about it individually. This is the usual course of events on office
markets in Dutch cities, because office rents of new and existing buildings vary only slightly
in the Netherlands. In this case, either government intervention or agreements on a central
level between market parties and the government are needed, either to restrict the supply or
to stimulate the demolition of the vacant building25
Companies building for their own use make other demands with respect to the type of
buildings they prefer. Often, they develop buildings in which specialized production methods
must be carried out; the buildings are then purely functional. The location of these buildings
is usually not as crucial to the development of the project as is the case in commercial
property development. Various motivations may play a role, like the proximiry to other
companies or to the market, the availability of certain services on industrial estates, a close
connection to the transportation network, and even the proximiry to the company director's
home town. The influence of the location on the resale value will almost never be a decisive
factor, as may be the case with respect to commercial property. In other situations, the new
building is developed in addition to the company's existing building stock on the same location.
In this case, the quality of the location plays practically no role at all (as long as it meets
certain basic standards).
The strategies of financial institutions on urban property markets are difficult to comprehend,
but a discussion of these strategies is - from a theoretical point of view - interesting, because
it brings into focus the concept of uncertainty that is central to any economic theory. In the
Netherlands, it is generally assumed that pension funds, insurance companies and other
n In the Netherlands, the most recent suggestion is to use vacant office buildings for the relief of refugees
waiting for an asylum!
47investors invest mainly in real estate to spread risk (usually risks are perceived to be relatively
low on the commercial property market). They content themselves with relatively low returns,
as long as these are higher than the rekenrente - this is the minimum return, calculated on
an actuarial base, that they must make to cover their obligations (for instance, paying
pensions). Real estate is considered to be a safe investment because of government influence
on this market; government policy especially reduces the uncertainty with respect to future
urban developments.26 The low returns go together with relatively low rents on the Dutch
commercial property market.27 This is in sharp contrast with the conditions in other West-
European countries, especially in Great Britain and France; here, financial institutions invest
in commercial property, because high returns are feasible.
Financial institutions' participation on urban property markets can, de facto, be entirely
ascribed to the element of risk that is characteristic to all property development, and the
possibility of getting returns on investments, as a result of these risks. A market for
investments in real estate would not exist if there were no uncertainty on this market. Investing
in real estate is risky because of the uncertainty with respect to future gains.2e Risk is thus
linked to uncertainty and incomplete information. As we know, lack of information can, to a
large extent, define human behaviour and is, because of this reason, a central element of new
institutional economic theory. Crucial to the functioning of modern markets, and certainly also
to the functioning of urban property markets, is the market's ability to turn uncertainty into risk.
Risk is a measurable concept - although we realise that this pronouncement is in itself risky -
and can therefore be linked to a rate of refurn: financial institutions argue that the higher the
risk, the higher the rate of return on investments has to be~ The optimal investment
opportunity shows a minimal risk and a maximum return. The high level of uncertainty on the
real estate investment market has both disadvantages and advantages, since imperfect market
conditions make it possible to build up an information lead with respect to other investors
This seems to be the general opinion; however, there is no convincing empirical evidence with respect to
financial institution's investment strategies on urban property markets. Investors are not very open-handed
with providing information.
See Van der Krabben (1993) on this point.
Compared to, for instance, the market for government bonds, real estate investments are more risky,
because of the higher uncertainty on real estate markets. This is the result of, among other things, the
heterogeneity of real estate, the fact that the real estate market is divided in several submarkets, and, in
general, the imperfect market conditions that are characteristic to real estate markets.
~ See Goslings (1990) on this point; he makes a similar distinctíon between risk and uncertainty. According
to Goslings, risk can be defined by a calculation of probability, while uncertainty indicates a series of single
events in random succession.
48during a longer period than would be possible on perfect markets. Investors can thus realise
exceptional returns!
It follows from this that the concept of uncertainty is apparently more complicated than it is
assumed to be in new institutional economic theory. For the line of argument in new
institutional economic theory is that uncertainry is typical to all human behaviour and that
institutions and organisations are created to reduce this uncertainty (in order to create perfect
market conditions). In a perfect market there should be optimal information; imperfect markets
are, among other things, characterised by non-optimal and~or a-symmetric information. This
is all true. We can indeed consider the concept of risk as an instifutional solution (or a tool for
strategic behaviour) for the existence of uncertainty on markets. However, this explanation
covers only part of the reality. Financial institutions' strategies are based on the existence of
risk in a market and their interests are not in all respects served by absolute risk reduction.
Perhaps we should make here a distinction between two types of risk. On the one hand, we
can easily assume that all individual actors, including financial institutions, try to reduce their
'individual' risk in order to maximise profits. If financial institutions consider investing in real
estate, then they will certainly investigate market conditions to minimise the chance of bad
results with respect to their investments. The reduction of market risk,however, does not serve
their interests because the returns would decline then as well. Actually, all financial institutions
strive for a-symmetric risk reduction.
On the other hand, the same financial institutions can freely choose to invest in risky projects,
speculating on high returns on their investments. Of course, in these situations they will also
gather as much information as possible to reduce their risk, but it is remarkable that in some
countries financial institutions are prepared to accept higher risks than are their colleagues in
other countries. Risky investment possibilities on a market are a necessary condition for some
actors to operate on this market. The latter depends on their motivations to invest in, for
instance, real estate: do they show risk-avoid~ng or risk-seeking behaviour? If real estate
investments were risk free, then investors wouldn't have any special reason to invest in real
estate.
It should be stressed here that the existence of variations in risk is an essential element ín the
way modern markets, including urban property markets, function. It is not our intention to
discuss in detail here financial institutions' investment strategies. However, we emphasize that
(1) financial institutions pursue various investment strategies (which may all be rational) and
that (2) we need a more differentiated approach to the meaning of uncertainry in markets -
especially in markets where investors play an important role. A-symmetric information will
49sometimes lead to market failure, but it is at the same time a necessary market condition for
financial institutions to invest in real estate. Risk-seeking investors will judge institutions that
mean to reduce uncertainty as inefficient, when this results in lower returns.
Land and property markets are driven by the consumer and producer demand for land and
buildings. The degree to which this demand is met by supply is shaped by (1) the institutions
that are created to increase efficiency, (2) the institutions that are created for reasons other
than efficiency reasons, and which possibly hinder the making of efficient choices by market
parties, and (3) the uncertainty that remains and with which the institutional context for some
reason is unable to deal.
The demand for locations and new buifdings continuously changes because of restructuring
processes taking place in the economic system. The same processes, as described above
with regard to the development industry, take place in other sectors of the economy. Because
of this, institutional relations between organisations in all sectors of the economy change as
well, and, consequently, this will lead to changing locational preferences and changing
preferences with respect to the rype of buildings of these organisations.
Local governments act as political organisations on the market and, in a way, also show
maximising behaviour (although this is of course not exclusively maximising behaviour in
economic terms, but in social terms as well). In this respect local governments do not behave
much differently from economic organisations. Besides, they are a part of the polity; in this role
they protect formal rules and try to increase efficiency by reducing information and transaction
costs.
(II) Relations between property development and the local economy
In another paper we have hypothesised the links between regional economic growth and
property development processes (Van der Krabben and Boekema, 1994). These hypotheses
are based on a study of economic growth and property development in 'Noordoost Brabant',
a region in the south-east of the Netherlands. From this study the following relations between
property development processes and the local economy were noted.
The substantial increase in the number of migrations of firms in this region between 1986 and
1991 has brought about an increase in activity on the real estate market: a growth of transac-
tions on the market for second-hand buildings and an increase of new building developments
(because not all remaining buildings are suitable for renewed occupancy). The latter develop-
ment is strengthened by the growth of the economy. Several aspects which are related to this
50mechanism are of interest. First, the growth of property transactions and the rise in new
building investments imply a more prominent role of the intermediary agents on the real estate
market, real estate agents and property developers respectively; the organisation of the
development industry changes. Second, undesirable side-effects may appear in the form of,
for instance, vacated, obsolete buildings in run-down areas and a shortage of locations for
less profitable functions (like social housing). Third, positive side-effects as a result of the
increased activity on the urban real estate market arise as well. For example, in the city of
Den Bosch, the area around the railway station will be redeveloped - a large amount of office
space is currently being built - resulting in a necessary, continuous renewal of the built
environment.
Fourth, the large number of firms moving to the region of North-east Brabant directly affects
the demand for new buildings in this region and has therefore created a scarcity of available
business sites. As a consequence, land prices, office rents, and commercial property values
have risen, resulting in more expensive business accommodation, on the one hand, and
capital and development gains for the present owners and the property developers
respectively, on the other hand. Besides, for municipalities it means a considerable growth in
revenues from land sales!
Fifth, both the increasing amount of capital that financial institutions poured into the built
environment during the 1980s and the changing demands for locations and rype of buildings
by companies have led to the destruction of capital, since buildings are becoming obsolete
sooner in functional terms.
The opposite is also true, that the special characteristics of real estate markets influence
regional economic growth in a number of ways. First, the municipality, as a land developer,
affects the firms' choice of where to establish themselves in two ways. The municipality
decides which locations will be developed for new business sites and, moreover, sets
conditions for establishment for certain business parks based on the type and size of the
companies. This affects at least the freedom of choice for companies. Second, the study
shows that service-sector firms are more mobile than industrial firms; the number of 'movers'
in the service sector is larger. We can add to this that commercial property development
(office buildings) - driven by both investment demand and productive demand - takes place
on a larger scale as well. For property developers, the driving force behind property
development is the short-term gain from developing the building and selling it to either the
final user or a financial institution. They are not concerned with the existing building stock; the
51sooner buildings are written off, thus, the better for them.
Third, the functional ageing of the existing building stock is visible in Den Bosch in the older
business parks, resulting in high vacancy rates and the negligence oi sites and buildings.
While new business parks are continuously developed, it is inevitable that other areas become
run-down. A considerable amount of government money is needed to revitalise these areas.
Finally, it is characteristic of the produciion of property for an allocation problem to exist. A
property developer's response to a demand for buildings is always delayed, because it takes
a relatively long time to develop a new building. To avoid this problem a developer may decide
to build speculatively, but then he risks (temporary) vacancy and capital losses. Although, in
the case of Den Bosch (we don't have any empirical evidence that supply-side blockages
actually constrain the level of demand for new buildings), it can be hypothesised that it is
characteristic to the functioning of real estate markets that market imperfections (i.e. there is
a demand, but the supply does not come forward at the right time and~or at the right place)
occur and hinder economic growth.
(III) The significance of variations in the organisation of the development industry
and the functioning of land and property markets
Both in an international context, in a national context, in different sectors of the property
market and through time, the organisation of the development industry and the functioning of
land and property markets vary. On an abstract level, a number of reasons are held
responsible for this:
(1) the degree of complexity of a market defines the mixed bag of institutions on
that market and thus the organisation of the development industry;
(2) the 'price' of obtaining information: the more expensive it is to obtain
information, the more problematic relations in the property development
industry and the functioning of property markets will be;
(3) the path dependency of an economy: the functioning of a market is affected by
the path that it has taken in the past. The degree of adaptive efficiency (the
willingness of a society to acquire knowledge, to induce innovations and to
undertake risk) shapes the way the organisation of the development índustry
evolves through time;
(4) the increasing returns that occur as a result of technological and institutional
change, shaped by the fact that markets are imperfect, influences the degree
of growth in a properry market.
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development industry exist. However, the consequences of these variations are unknown. Do
they result in different urban spatial patterns, in differences in the type of buildings that are
developed and with respect to the quality of the built environment, and do they influence
supply~demand relations differently? Do they perhaps even result in different levels of
economic growth - as North suggests with his 'path dependency' argument? For example, the
fact that in Great Britain risky, speculative developments are common to urban property
markets, while in the Netherlands this is a rare phenomenon cannot be explained with help
of standard economic arguments. There is no reason to believe that, in the Netherlands, it
should not be possible to make profits out of speculative developments. A more plausible -
but difficult to prove - explanation for this might be that because Dutch developers do not
have any experience with this type of development, they will not easily start with it.
Again, on a theoretical level, it can be argued that the variations in the way the property
development industry is organised and in the way in which land and property markets function
have at least five implications:
(1) the degree of adaptive efficiency in a society and the increasing returns as a
result of technological and institutional change directly influences economic
growth in that society. As a result, the level of new building developments will
vary;
(2) the number of market imperfections that occur in a market is influenced by the
way a property market functions; this is related to the degree of efficiency in
that market;
(3) the way the development industry is organised affects what type of
organisations - and where their origins are - will develop land and new
buildings in a local economy (for example, the more complicated a local market
is, the more difficult it is for developers to enter this market, due to insufficient
information);
(4) the costs of property development in a market are influenced by the way the
(5)
development industry operates in that market, since the level of transaction and
information costs depend on this;
the market value of land and property in a market may be (indirectly) affected
as well, because the institutional context structures competition in a market.
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region do matter (Healey; 1993a, 1993b). She holds that many sources of variation in regional
property markets can be found:
'One dimension is clearly the nature of demand in the local economy. However, this
itself is multidimensional, with variations not merely between sectors (industrial,
commercial, retail) but between segments (small, local firms seeking new premises for
expansion; outside companies seeking to locate in the region etc), in interest in land
(investors, occupiers), and in scale ofcomparison (within a neighbourhood, the region,
the nation, Europe, the world)' (Healey, 1993a: p. 1).
The nature of demand has consequences for the way land and buildings are treated (for
example, an investment orientation to land and property or an interest primarily in the use
value of a site).
A second dimension relates to the supply of sites and properties. This varies with the
particular geography and history of places' (ibid.: p. 2).
This refers to the stock of sites and properties in a region - their location, configuration,
physical conditions and ownership. Healey concludes from this that 'a critical dimension of
regional property market variation is therefore the overall state of the balances between supply
and demand in all the different property market segments' (ibid.: p.2). However, she mentions
a third dimension of variation, the institutional relations of land and property markets.
'The significance of this institutional dimension is particularly clear in land and property
development markets. !n markets with weak demand and few transactions, it is these
relations which become critical in bringing sites and projects forward. These in turn
impacf on patterns of value and transaction Ievels in local markets overall. These
institutional relations include the mix and networks of property market interests
(landowner~, developers, financiers, consultants), the form of public policy towards
development promotion (primarily urban policy since the 1960s), and the form of
development regulation (ie: planning policy) (ibid.: p. 2).
The relevance of local institutional relations for a local economy is also explained by Amin and
Thrift (1993). Resting their argument on empirical evidence of the economic dynamics of
regions both in Europe and the US, they hold that localised institutional relations are relevant
to local economic success. At the same they argue that this is still an unexpfored field of
54research; we don't know what kind of institutional relations make a region successful'o
Institutional relations in the property development industry in the Netherlands have never been
the subject of analysis; the foregoing shows that this is an omission.
(I~ Implications of market imperfections on land and property markets
Most authors seem to agree that land and property markets are characteristically imperfect.
However, they hold different views with respect to the seriousness of the imperfections for
property market functioning, the explanations for the imperfections, the chance that market
imperfections lead to market failure and what should be understood by the term "market
failure".
In general, market failure on urban reaf estate markets is expressed in either an over-supply
of or an over-demand for land and buildings. Because we hold a broader conception of
market failure, and because it seems that market failures are becoming ever more common
to urban property markets, we will devote the next section to this subject.
~ See also Piore and Sabel (1984), Cheshire (1990).
556. IMPERFECT MARKET CONDITIONS AND MARKET FAILURE
The introductionary section of this paper argued that a theoretical model of the development
process should be developed in order to aid in understanding the functioning of the property
market. More precisely, a better understanding is needed with respect to suppty~demand
relations on land and property markets; we expected them to be more complicated than
seems to be generally assumed in urban studies. In this section we will elaborate on this
assumption and show that indeed many situations can be found in which the supply of land
and buildings does not automatically adjust to the demand for land and buildings by firms,
institutions and households, sometimes resulting in either an oversupply or a shortage of
supply.
Three aspects of this relationship will be examined. First, the imperfect market conditions that
are characteristic to real estate markets are examined. We will see then which theoretical
explanations are given for these market imperfections. Second, attention is paid to the extent
to which supply-side blockages actually play a role on urban property markets. Do supply-
side constraints under certain circumstances define the level of economic growth in an urban
region? In what other respects do they influence the production of the built environment
(location, type of buildings, time)? Besides, we investigate the chances of property-led
regeneration policies. Can it be expected that in some situations stimulating the supply of land
and buildings will bring forward an extra demand? What are the limits of success of enlarging
urban economic growth with help of a policy directed to stimulate land and property
development? We intend to explain the complexity of supply~demand relations with the help
of our 'institutional model of the development process.' After an anaiysis of social relations
between the groups of actors that take part in the property development process, we will finish
this section with a theoretical concept of market failure.
6.1 A classification of imperfect markef conditions
Traditionally neo-classical economists have extensively studied market imperfections.31 Neo-
classical economics assumes that the following conditions are necessary for economic
efficiency through the market:
Marvey has expounded neo-classical urban economics; we follow his explanation of economic efficiency
and inefficiency in urban economies (Harvey, 1992).
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costs (often referred to as 'externalities), and the ability of the market mechanism to
supply all goods and services provided society is able and willing to pay the necessary
costs' (Harvey, 1992: p. 12)
The efficiency of a market depends, according to Harvey, on both technical and economic
characteristics. With respect to the technical characteristics of real estate markets, Harvey
argues that:
physical conditions should ensure that price differences for the same commodity within
the market are eliminated easily and quickly. This comes about by buyers moving to
the cheaper parts and sellers moving to the dearer. This requires that both buyers and
sellers must have up-to-date knowledge of price ditferences and base their actions
solely on price. Moreover, dealing costs should be small relative to the value of the
transaction' (ibid., p. 22,23).
With the real estate market, it is not only difficult to obtain perfect knowledge but dealing costs
are relatively high as well. 'Knowledge tends to be obtained infrequentty and is timited
geographically. Most occupiers (as distinct from investors) move in response to changes in
family circumstances, income or business conditions. Only rarely do they move for the sole
purpose of making a gain from a price or rent difference' (ibid., p. 23). Valuers and agents play
a role in the property market just to provide the lacking knowledge. However, this information
can never be perfect, because of the uncertainty about future gain.32
Apart from these physical features that lead to imperfect market conditions, economic
characteristics of property markets cause also market imperfections.
'We have to ask: is there freedom of entry into the market? Does the market consist
of many buyers and sellers each so small that no one can exert monopoly powers?
Generally speaking, there is freedom of entry into real property markets, resulting in
many buyers and many sellers. But wc must also recognise that certain conditions
allow an owner to gain some monopolistic control' (ibid., p. 24).
According to Harvey, such conditions are:
(1)
,.
the geographical divisions of the market lead to imperfect competition between
local markets;
Other imperfect market conditions that are characteristic to land and property markets are: land and property
are not mobile in the same way as workers or machines, land and property are relatively expensive goods,
they are durable, and there are financial and institutional constraints on their supply.
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borrowing the large sums required for certain purchases, e.g. multi-story
office-blocks;
(3) the spatial fixity of real property puts certain site-owners in a strong position
relative to a buyer.
Neo-classical economists do not consider these imperfeci market conditions as structurally
problematic. The following statement is revealing in this respect:
'We must not overemphasise the barriers in the real property market. Better knowledge
can result from the increasing mobility of peopie and funds, and from the more
sophisticated methods of calculating values. And, by and large, prices do respond,
albeit somewhat sluggishly, to changes in market conditions; given sufficient time, the
necessary adjustments to supply and demand do take place. (...) Any institution or
government action which serves to make knowledge better or more readily available
is likely to be beneficial' (Harvey, 1992: p. 25).
Apart from the fact that this is a rather subjective pronouncement - how do we know that
imperfect market conditions are the exception and perfect market conditions the rule? - such
an approach to markets is of no help in urban areas that are characterised by problematic
supply~demand relations on the property market.
Several studies of property market functioning are available which suggest that property
development processes go less smoothly than is assumed in neo-classical theory.
Concentrating on contributions in which the complexity of property markets is studied, viz. the
occurrence of supply-side blockages, we mention here (in what should not be seen as a
complete list) Barrett and Healey (1985), Evans (1985), MacGregor etal. (1985), Perry (1986)
Fothergill et al. (1987), Adams et al. (1988), Henneberry (1988), Gloster and Smith (1989),
Morgan (1990), Adams and May (1991), Healey (1991), Adams et al. (1993), Imrie and
Thomas (1993). In Healey et al. (1992), an extensive overview of property-led regeneration
policies is given. Surprisingly, we don't know of any studies on this subject carried out in the
Netherlands.33 The functioning of the English property market is - probably rightly so -
considered as being more problematic, compared to the functioning of the Dutch urban
On the other hand, several studies carried out in European, Asian and American cities suggest that supply-
side constraints in different forms do not solely exist in English cities, but are a wide-spread phenomenon
existing in most cities. See for example: Fainstein et al., 1983; Feagin, 1987; Molotch and Vicari, 1988;
Fainstein, 1990; Vicari and Molotch, 1990; Pryke, 1991; Haila, 1991; Beauregard, 1991; Krátke, 1992; Berry
and Huxley (1992), Clark and Gullberg, Sykora (1993).
58property market. However, this is not a very convincing reason not to study the influence of
supply-side constraints (or the reason why they are absent) on the Dutch urban property
market.
In most of the English studies, empirical evidence has been sought with respect to the
meaning of supply-side blockages related to urban economic growth. In the present paper,
we make use of these studies to provide a general overview of the subject. The greater part
of the studies concern the shortage of building land for new developments; the role of land
owners has been questioned. In other studies problems regarding the construction of new
buildings and the conflicting interests of the development industry and the users of buildings
have been analyzed. Before we will turn to this literature, first the concept of markef failure
as distinguished from market imperfections must be defined.
Neo-classical economic theory holds that we should speak of market failure when the market
is not able to achieve an optimal allocation of goods and services, given the budgets and
preferences of the individual actors that are operating on the market. The concept of market
failure is referred to as follows. Normally, markets will produce an optimal allocation of
resources and an optimal level of production of all outputs. Market failure exists in situations
in which the operation of the market does not produce the socially optimal level of output of
a particular good or service. In such a situation the level of production is below the social
optimum: the costs of increased provision would be exceeded by the value of that production,
but the market fails to bring about the optimal production.
However, we argue here that in many cases this definition is meaningless, since we are not
able to define when allocation is optimal. To be able to do this, we need to know every
individual's budget and preferences. If we don't know when allocation is optimal, then we don't
know when allocation is not optimal, either.
Standard neo-classical economics postulates a relatively unproblematic relationship between
demand and supply. If there is a demand for new property, supply more or less automatically
keeps step. Price adjustments act as the mediating mechanism. If there is a shortage of
buildings, property prices or rent levels will rise. As a result, the provision of buildings
becomes more profitable and the development industry will construct new buildings. Contrarily,
if there is an oversupply of buildings, property prices and rent levels will decrease. Then, of
course, the construction of new buildings becomes less profitable and developers will
(partially) withdraw themselves from the market. This mechanism may function smoothly when
59the basic assumptions of full information, full mobility, full divisibility and correct prices are
fulfilled. It follows from this that market imperfections may occur when these perfect-market
conditions are not met. Buyers and sellers may have inadequate information, both land and
property as a product are not homogenous (second-hand and new property markets; property
is always bound to location), transactions may be few and prices may adjust only slowly to
eliminate surpluses or deficits. Besides, there may be supply-side constraints and externalities
that undermine the functioning of land and property markets.
From the English literature on this subject we can deduce a variety of causes that are held
responsible for market failure, some of them being typical to urban property markets and
others being valid for all kind of markets.
Supply-side blockages which are recognised by neo-classical economics are mainly
,monopoly land ownership and constraints on supply caused by the planning system.~
Externalities can be defined as:
'benefits or costs which accrue to an individual, group, or firm as a direct result of
consumption or production by another individual, group, or firm for which no price is
paid or no payment is received' (Balchin et al., 1988: p. 141).
Both negative and positive externalities occur on markets, involving respectively non-market
costs and non-market benefits between individuals~firms, individuals~ndividuals, orfirms~firms.
On every market sometimes the market fails to provide goods or services for which
firms~instítutions~households are willing to pay a price. This may be due to positive
externalities; for example, a city's inhabitants all benefit from an inner-city redevelopment
project without directly paying for it (indirectly they do by paying municipal taxes). As a
consequence, property developers do not want to develop it, because the revenues are not
sufficient. Negative externalities do not lead to supply-side constraints, but may on the other
hand force municipalities to intervene; for example, in a situation that a proposed development
project will have undesirable side-effects, municipalities may decide not to permit the
development.
Several authors have argued that the availability of land for new developments may be
problematic (see especially the studies by Adams et al. (1988, 1993) and Gloster and Smith
See Evans (1987) and Cheshire and Sheppard (1989) on the way the planning system limits supply and
Markusen and Scheffman (1978) on monopoly land ownership (all mentioned in Healey (1991); see also
Howes (1989).
60(1989)) and hinder new development. Adams et al. (1993) have made an extensive study of
the functioning of the land market in the greater Manchester area. They conclude that the
insufficient supply of building land on high-quality locations indeed obstructs industrial growth.
Their study is further founded by the work of Fothergill et al. (1987) on the functioning of
industrial property markets. They provide empirical evidence that not only a shortage in the
supply of land influences regional industrial development, but also the way the provision of
buildings takes place. Firms building for their own use have different strategies than the
property developers whích build for the market. The former choose a location that is most
profitable from the point of view of production; the latter only want to build on locations on
which they are assured of sufficient revenues. Besides, they only build standardised buildings,
because there is a larger market for this type of buildings. This means that we must
distinguish different kind of producers. It is argued in the Fothergill-study that neo-classical
economic theory with its concept of market imperfections fails to explain why industrial
property markets do not always function smoothly. The pattern of industrial location is not only
determined by the preferences of manufacturing firms but also by the supply of suitable land
and buildings. Fothergill et al. (1987) argue that market imperfections may result in a rigidity
in patterns of industrial location. Locational inertia are often a financial problem, because of
the low market value of large, specialised, second-handed buildings and because for most
firms buildings are fixed overhead rather than a variable factor of production.
In a study of conflicts in the industrial property market Henneberry (1988) analyses the
dichotomy that exists between the aims of the occupiers and of the developers~funders of
buildings. In two case studies, again in Great Britain, Henneberry shows that this can lead to
conflicting interests between the two groups of actors and possibly the failure of new
developments to occur.
In the Netherlands no empirical evidence of market failure on urban real estate markets is
available. Nevertheless, several examples are on hand which show that market failure is
certainly not an unknown phenomenon to the Dutch real estate market. The two most manifest
and classic examples of market failure are:
(1) the present high vacancy rates on the office market which can cause difficulties
for the owners and which is considered to be socially unwanted (it is expected
that vacancy rates keep rising in the near future);
(2) the shortage of building land, for the development of residential property
(municipalities do not make use of the available government money to build
61houses, because there is not enough land to build on), blocking new
developments.
Less noticeable, but not less important examples are:
(3) the recent failure of the development of the Y-oever project in Amsterdam; a
.~ . large amount of office spacQ~d ot í~er functions is not developed because the
investors have withdrawn from the project. This means, among other things,
that government money is wasted during the preparation period and, moreover,
that the uncertainty with respect to commercial property investments in general
has increased;
(4) some of the Dutch financial institutions and the real estate investment
companies made enormous losses on their real estate assets in recent years.
Scandinavian investors who entered the Dutch commercial property market in
the late 1980s made even bigger losses. Apparently, it is very difficult to
estimate the need for future properry development. Again, this may deter other
potential investors;
(5) the property development industry complains that in the four large cities -
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht - office development is much
too decentralized on diverse locations. As a result, international top locations
are missing and high returns are not feasible: since the returns on property
investments are low, land prices stay low as well. Because for local
governments land development costs are relatively high, in many cases
redevelopment of inner-city areas can only take place subsidized by the
central government;
(6) in the 1980s a large amount of commercial properry has been developed near
highways. Because of changed government policy with respect to the location
of working places, it is no longer allowed to develop commercial property on
these locations (instead, the government now encourages commercial property
development near public transport junctions). However, the already developed
locations will be in use for many years, being jointly responsible for traffic jams,
etc., which are currently obstructing economic growth;
(7) some of the older industrial areas have to struggle with the consequences of
technical obsolescence (and sometimes the location is no longer optimal from
an economic point of view), becoming less attractive for companies. These
62areas become run-down and either a large amount of government money is
needed to revitalise them, or the areas are not improved, thus being
responsible for a degradation of the quality of the built environment;
(8) the special spatial characteristics of the Dutch property market are responsible
for the fact that office rents and property values are - in an internationat
context - low and stable. Two different problems are related to this. On the one
hand, the price mechanism does not function smoothly: in some cities there is
a demand for office space, but new developments do not take place because
development costs exceed property values. In this case we would expect a rise
in office rents; this, however, does not happen. On the other hand, low property
values go hand in hand with (relatively) cheap building construction. Because
property values are low and not rising, there is a limit to the building costs. As
a result, the quality of the built environment is in danger.
(9) the valuation of land and property is often problematic; this may result, for
instance, in unnecessary government subsidies, when municipalities charge
land prices that do not cover the costs of (re)developing the land.
(10) Some of the recently developed business parks in various cities are only partly
developed, due to the current economic recession, being responsible for capital
losses for municipalities. Besides, these business parks risk to become less
attractive, when a considerable part of it is wasteland;
(11) Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam has become one of the most attractive locations
as a place of business for internationally operating firms. This brings in the
possibility of monopoly landownership, as is indeed the case at this moment.
Land speculation by a private developer blocks new developments.
In these examples we do not always speak of market failure in the true sense of the word.
Nevertheless, the problems that are mentioned are certainly characteristic to property
development processes. Section 6.4 will elaborate this point; we will speak of concealed
market failure.
Healey criticises neo-classical models of urban development on a fundamental level.
According to her they fail to take account of
(1) diverse forms of demand, particularly the difference between user and investor
demand;
63(2) the non-economic interests of those involved in development (particularly
landowners decisions to sell);
(3) the very considerable uncertainty in assessing future gain, due to the timescale
of the development process and the limited number of transactions in land and
property markets;
(4) the distortions produced by the valuation and appraisal methods used to
assess risk and reward; for example, the different conclusions of residual and
comparative approaches to establishing land prices;
(5) the complexity of the development process itself. Projects involve the
realization of sets of events, over a considerable period of time, with different
actors potentially significant in each (Healey, 1991: p. 222, 223).
Although it was not explicitly mentioned by Healey, an addition can easily be made to her
argument: because of these reasons, neo-classical models are inadequate not only in
explaining urban development, but in explaining market failure as well.
First, market failures can be the result of the bounded rationality that is characteristic of
human behaviour. Empirical evidence for this can be found in the above-mentioned studies
concerning landowners' behaviour. Adams and May, for instance, have identified different
strategies of landowners in development processes, dividing their behaviour into either active
or passive (Adams and May, 1991). In line with this argument, it can be held that particularly
landowners showing passive behaviour behave boundedly rational.
Second, opportunistic behaviour of actors in the development process may lead to market
failure (this relates to Healey's third argument). We have seen that in all kind of markets
contracts are introduced to prevent adverse consequences of possible opportunistic behaviour
(both transaction and information costs arise because of this). However, in some cases it may
prove to be difficult to make a sound contract including aIl involved actors or to make a
contract at all.
Third, we subscribe to the neo-classical viewpoint that a lack of information may cause
market failure. However, the neo-classical concept of missing information fails to explain why
in some situations a lack of information exists and in other, comparable situations it does not.
We know now that this can be explained by the fact that information is not costless. So, we
must analyse in which situations the costliness of information impedes the smooth functioning
of the market. In order to this, Section Five of this paper will discuss financial institutions'
investment strategies. When uncerfainty can be translated into measurable risk, then the
64smooth functioning of the market doesn't have to be constrained, because the level of risk
manifests itself in the rate of return on investments that can be obtained. In this case it is likely
that an investment market comes into existence. Goods can be produced, because financial
institutions show an interest in them. In other circumstances, when risk is either not
measurable or too high, investors won't be prepared to invest and production may not come
forward: there is a discrepancy between user and investor demand.
Fourth, the concept of uncertainry must be further developed. Neo-classícal economic theory
does not take into account the possibility and consequences of a-symmetric information.
Often a dissimilarity with respect to the knowledge different groups of actors dispose of can
be observed. In other words, the extent to which uncertainty exists may vary for different
groups of actors. For example, the person who sells his house knows more about its quality
than do interested buyers. As a result, information costs arise, as the potential buyer has to
hire an expert who can provide the necessary information. This argument is relevant to our
discussion of market failure, because it may lead to situations in which supply is not able to
meet demand. Because of the special characteristics of real estate - every plot of land or
building is unique, so the person who sells will almost always possess more information than
the one who buys - we may expect that on urban properry markets a-symmetric information
often results in considerable information costs. Because of these information costs, total costs
rise and sometimes production does not take place, because the extra costs are not reflected
in the price that the consumer is willing to pay. It may also occur that the a-symmetry of the
information cannot be removed, because the involved actors do not want it to. In this case,
it may also occur that supply does not come forward. To make this even more complicated,
it can be added that on the real estate investmenf market, the possibiliry of obtaining more
information than other market parties is one of the prime conditions for real estate investment.
` In this case, it can be argued that market parties' strategies are directed to creating situations
characterised by a-symmetric information.
Finally, neo-classical economics does not explicitly take account of the meaning of the
institutional context. As a result, in the neo-classical tradition the institutional context is never
considered to be responsible for market imperfections. Inefficient institutions - sometimes
inherited from the past (institutional inertia), sometimes deliberately created (because of non-
market reasons) - exist on all kind of markets. Institutional inefficiency may also result in
market failure.rFor example, several authors have shown that the planning system impedes
optimal allocation by market forces; i.e. in situations in which non-market functions, like social
housing, are favoured and commercial projects cannot be developed on the optimal location.
65It follows from this that differences in the institutional context sometimes explain why
developments do or do not take place.
6.2 Urban Policy Instruments
The above-mentioned arguments suggest that urban policy, when based on the neo-classical
assumptions about imperfect market conditions and market failure, will not always successfully
deal with (the consequences of) market imperfections, since such a policy, possibly, uses the
wrong causes as a starting point.
In this respect we refer to a discussion of the limits of property-led regeneration by Imrie and
Thomas (1993). In Great Britain, property-led regeneration is a widely tested policy to
stimulate economic growth in urban regions, especially in regions with a weak economy. In
the Netherlands, urban regeneration plans are not exclusively developed to stimulate
economic growth, but rather to improve the quality of the urban environment (with economic
growth considerations coming in second place). Imrie and Thomas argue that a policy aimed
at promoting property development is doomed to fail when certain supply-side blockages are
not recognised and removed - assumed that there is an existing demand for property. They
hold that the success of this type of public policy depends particularly on the organisational
structure of the development industry and the linkages between the development industry and
the public sector.
The optímal organisational strucfure of the development industry is admittedly a vague concept
- and we do not attempt to define what should be the optimal organisational structure - but
it is a clear indication that variations in the organisational structure may lead to different
outcomes of the development process and that institutional relations matter. Imrie and Thomas
have provided empirical evidence in a case study of property-led regeneration policy in Cardiff
that changes in institutional relations are necessary for a successful execution of this policy.'s
Besides, significant inputs of public investments in basic infrastructure and the existence of
long-term strategic planning of the built environment are strongly needed to win property
developers and investors over to invest in new developments. The latter underlines how
crucial it is to a successful urban policy to create situations in which financial institutions are
willing to invest: low risks and high returns.
Healey's study of the organization of the development industry in the Tyne and Wear region endorses this
point (Healey, 1993a and b).
666.3 Social Relations in the Property Development Process
Market failure is in many cases caused by problematic institutional relations between the
actors that are involved in the property development process. Earlier we referred to studies
by Imrie and Thomas (1993) and Healey (1993 a and b), showing the negative consequences
of imperfect institutional relations in the property development industry in Great Britain.
Is it possible now to make a classification of problematic institutional relations on property
markets? According to Chambert, a development process consists of four different stages,
namely the phase of previous land use, the phase of inediating landownership, the phase of
production and the phase of ownership~use (consumption). In each of these stages a number
of functions is carried out by the agents in the development process: the provision of
finance~credit, land and property development, the actual production of the building and the
final use of the building (Chambert, 1988).'~ Subsequently, the actors are identified that are
involved in each stage of the development process: the previous landowner, the mediating
landowner, the promoterldeveloper, the financier, the producer, the property owner and the
user. Moreover, Chambert identifies eight different forms of interaction that will generally occur
during a development process. These moments of interaction highlight the social relations that
underlie the organisation of the property development industry. For each of them we can
describe under which circumstances these social relations may be problematic and lead to
market failure.37
3]
Comparable models of the development process can be found in Gore and Nicholson (1991) and Healey
(1991).
We must keep in mind that the organization of the development industry varies in different sectors of the
property market and also in an international context. Here, the discussion is limited to the market for
commercial property in the Netherlands.
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68(1) Mediating land purchase: land sale from the previous landowner to
mediating land owner (land developer).
In the majority of cases in the Netherlands, the local government is the mediating landowner.
This is due to the fact that relatively high costs are involved with servicing the land. Because
land prices, even on top locations, are low and are not expected to rise very much - there is
an oversupply of high quality locations that are more or less identical to each other - private
developers are not interested in developing the land. This tendency is even more pronounced
because of externalities that occur on the land market, i.e. soil pollution and costs of
infrastructure and so on. Local governments do not in the first place develop building land to
make a profit out of it. tThey see it as their task to make sure that there is always enough
building land available.3e `In this stage of the development process supply~demand relations
may be disturbed when previous landowners don't want to sell their land because of non-
economic reasons. In the Netherlands, this does not seem to cause any problems, because
the existing legal framework is appropriate to deal with it (compulsory purchase powers of
municipalities). Nevertheless, more and more municipalities seem to complain now that they
are running out of building land, especially on the edges of towns where they need to develop
new residential areas.
The existing building structure may act, moreover, as a constraint to land development: new
developments can take place only after existing buildings are demolished. As a result, in many
cases the redevelopment of inner-city areas takes place only heavily subsidised by the central
government.
(2) Credit for land purchaser: credit~investment from financier to land
developer.
In the Netherlands, municipalities pay the costs of buying the land and land development with
money that they borrow on the capital market; this does not, in general, cause any problem.
Municipalities are considered to be reliable creditors. Municipal land departments operate
relatively independently and in recent years they seem to do this, in financial terms at least,
successfully. However, Kortenoever has shown that municipalities risk financial setbacks as
land developers in a period of economic stagnation (Kortenoever, 1989). They have to bear
high interest costs when they are not able to sell the building plots.
In countries where the land developer is a private company, the developer may encounter
difficulties with financing the proposed development because of several reasons: the financier
~ Building land is considered as a public good, like water and electricity; see Needham (1992) on this point.
69possesses only limited information about the value of the developed land, and uncertainty
exists about obtaining planning permissions, the demand for building land, or other investment
opportunities.
(3) Land purchase for production: land sale from land developer to
promoter~developer.
In this case problems will particularly come into existence because of a lack of clarity with
respect to the price of land. Land as a product is not homogenous, transactions may be few
and prices may adjust only very slowly to eliminate surpluses or deficits. The value of land
depends on the future revenues of the building that will be developed on the land minus the
costs of the development.~ proves to be very difficult to asses both these future gains and
the building costs, so that it is not certain that the realized land price correctly reflects the
economic value of the land. This is a typical example of a-symmetric information. The
J
developer possesses more information about the costs of the development project and the
likely future revenues out of the development than the municipality does. So, the developer
knows exactly what the maximum price is that he is willing to pay for the land. The
municipality knows this only approximately. In the Netherlands several authors have argued
that municipalities charge relatively low land prices resulting in large development gains for
the property developers (Kruijt ef al., 1990). One of the reasons for this is that municipalities
use land policy as part of their economic policy: they offer cheap land to attract companies
to their towns.
(4) Building contract: irom developer to producer.
Variations exist with respect to the organisation of the development industry: who is the
developer and who is the builder? Sometimes the developer also carries out the construction
work (or vice versa), sometimes the developer is a subsidiary company of the investor; in
other situations there is no relation between the developer, the building company and the
investor. The way the development industry is organised affects the extent to which problems
may occur, in this respect. In a study of building developments in an urban region in the south
of the Netherlands, it appeared that on the residential property market most developers had
theír origins in this region, while on the commercial property market property developers also
came from outside the region (Boekema and Van der Krabben, 1992; Van der Krabben and
Boekema, forthcoming). The construction companies that were involved with new
developments came almost exclusively from inside the region. Four regional construction
70companies operated as a joint venture in this region; they were responsible for a large part
of all building construction activities. It is not surprising that the scale of the building
construction market is limited to a regional level. The market is very complicated and a lack
of information (i.e. about municipal development plans, the availability of land, the demand for
new buildings, etc.) will prevent many developers from outside the region from participating
in new developments.
In the Netherlands the municipalities, as land developers, usually negotiate with property
developers in the case of new building developments. The significance of this should not be
underestimated: particularly with respect to residential property, municipalities contract with
the developers~construction company. Often, they work together with only a few familiar
companies, in this way possibly influencing competition on the market (among other things,
because it is difficult to find out exact market prices available on the market for building
construction). On the commercial property market, the property developers more often take
the initiative for new developments. Besides, commercial property developers operate almost
always on a national (and sometimes international) scale. As a result, the developers
operating on a regional commercial property market are a mixed bag of companies from both
inside and outside the region.
(5J Credit for construction: from financier to developer~producer.
Aspects that play a role in the relationship between the financier and the developer are,
among others, the type of relation, the uncertainty with respect to future gain, the
consequences of changes in investment strategies of financial institutions, and the variations
that exist in different sectors of the property market and in different regions with respect to the
risk of the development (who bears the risk).
Financial institutions sometimes have their own development companies; in these cases the
relation between financier and developer is unproblematic. When the relation between
financier and developer is a market relation, then the extent to which uncertainty exists with
respect to future gain defines the negotiations between financier and developer. In the
Netherlands financiers are usually willing to invest in commercial property only when the
building is already let (at least 75o~0 of the building); in other words, the developer has to bear
the risk. For that matter, municipalities often do not allow speculative property development:
they issue building permission only when a large part of the building (75oIo) is already let.
The flow of capital to the commercial property market seems to be stable and growing over
the years; therefore, consequences of changes in investment strategies of financial institutions
71for the functioning of the property market seem to be only marginal.
(6) Sale of property: from developer to property owner.
Because of the special characteristics of both commercial property markets and industrial
property markets, problems may arise with respect to assessing the correct price for property.
Again, property as a product is not homogenous, transactions may be few and may adjust
only very slowly to eliminate surpluses or deficits, uncertainty exists about future gains (risks
of vacancy and~or a drop in rent levels); moreover, the property market consists of two sub-
markets - a market for new buildings and a market for second-hand buildings - which are
closely interwoven with each other. Price adjustments on one of these sub-markets affect
prices on the other sub-market. These aspects make the assessment of the correct price
sometimes extremely difficult. The residential properry market, on the other hand, is
transparent and regional price developments are monthly published. Note that, in principle,
properry markets in the Netherlands are fully transparent, since all sales are recorded in a
public register (the kadaster); considerable information costs, however, are involved.
An extensive framework of institutional arrangements exists. In comparison with other markets,
the nexus of institutions on property markets, determining, among other things, correct prices
(surveyors) and bringing supply and demand together (real estate agents) is relatively
advanced, resulting in a more or less smoothly functioning market.
(7) Owner~user relation: from final owner to final user: tenancy.
In the Netherlands, tenancy contracts for commercial property usually last for a period of five
years. In this period rent levels are adjusted only to inflation; real price adjustments can take
place only once in five years. The level of rent for commercial property on different locations
and in different regions can be determined with some precision; rent levels, moreover, are
regularly published. In essence, owner~user relations are unproblematic. Note that renting
office space is common practice, but that industrial property is almost never developed
commercially. Investors apparently consider the risks as too high (no standardised buildings;
risk of vacancy is unacceptable for them).
A particular aspect of the Dutch commercial property market is the absence of large variations
in prices, both with respect to regional and local variations, with respect to differences
between new and exísting property, and in time. Although this issue is only indirectly related
to the tenancy issue, it is mentioned here because it defines (differences in) rent levels and
in this way also the working of the price mechanism. This price mechanism doesn't function
72properly on the Dutch office market: price adjustments do not take place in case of oversupply
or shortage. The difference in quality between new office buildings and existing office buildings
is not reflected in an equal difference in price. As a result, we may expect relatively high
vacancy rates in the existing building stock, because the financial threshold for firms to move
to a new building is low (rent levels are only slightly higher).
(8) Longterm finance: from financier to property owner (when property owner
is final user).
On the commercial property market firms rent office space; the property owner, then, is usually
a financial institution who invests its own money in the building. It is estimated that roughly
half of all office space is developed commercially. If the user of the building is also the owner,
there are two possibilities. Either the property owner borrows money on the capital market,
or it finances the purchase with its own money. In general, banks are ready to provide long-
term financing, since the building is a security for their risks.
The above must be considered as examples of social relations between actors involved in the
development process. When these social relations are complicated and~or imperfect, they may
lead to market failure. In this respect, market failure refers not only to situations in which
oversupply or a shortage of supply exists, but also to situations in which either the location
of new developments, the type of new developments, or the moment in time when the building
is developed is not optimal. Moreover, non optimal institutional relations in the property
development industry may lead to unwanted side-effects.
6.4 A concept of market failure
Having described the various types of market imperfections on urban land and property
markets, we will finish this section now by providing a concept of the different rypes of market
failure that are caused by these imperfections. We make a distinction here between absolute
market failure and concealed market failure. This needs more explanation.
In a"simple" market we speak of market failure when the market does not produce the
socially optimal level of output of a particular good or service. The level of production is then
below the social optimum: the costs of increased provision would be exceeded by the value
of that production, but the market fails to bring about the optimal production. In most cases
this can be explained by assuming that the market is temporarily out of equilibrium (unless
73externalities or a lack of information exist, but government intervention can deal with this). In
a complicated market, it doesn't make sense to speak of temporary disequilibria; the market
is structurally out of equilibrium. Besides, we cannot even define the equilibrium. In such a
market, it is much more interesting to take real market situations as a starting point instead
of testing the validity of the theoretical model. This means that we must try to classify different
situations in which market failure plays a role, be it absolute market failure (an absolute
shortage of supply or an absolute oversupply) or concealed market failure (suboptimal market
solutions, unwanted side-effects). These situations have in common a mismatch between
supply and demand. Often, they are connected with the special characteristics of land and
buildings. We must make a careful distinction here between causes and consequences;
imperfect market conditions are considered to be the causes, while market failures are the
consequences of these imperfect conditions.
74The following operational concept is proposed:
Absolute market failure:
1. The market fails to provide property for which firms, institutions or households are
willing to pay a price: an absolute shortage of property;
2. The market provides property for which there appears to be no effective demand: an
absolute oversupply of property.
Concealed market failure
3. Firms, institutions or households are located either in a building or on a location that
is not optimal from the point of view of production or, in case of the location of
households, from the point of view of their utility function: either the quality of the
building or the type of building is suboptimal. We speak of locational inertia.
4. New developments are carried out only by the development industry, when subsidised
by the government. The development industry is not able to build for the current
market price.
5. When vacant buildings are not reoccupied, considerable costs are involved with
demolishment of the building and redevelopment of the area. If redevelopment does
not take place, the area becomes run down.
6. When a firm establishes itself on a certain location, then this location is no longer
available for other firms that would be optimally located on the concerned location and
that are willing to pay the market price. This is a consequence of the fact that space
is limited.
7. Because every location is unique, places with unique locational qualities may come
into existence, resulting in undesirable monopoly ownership of land. Monopoly
ownership of land is therefore characteristic to urban land markets.
8. New developments that are carried out by the development industry are of a low
quality, resulting in a low quality of the built environment as well.
9. Undeserved development gains are made by one of the market parties (including local
governments) out of land or property development, because of the imperfect working
of the price mechanism.
757. CONCLUSIONS
Can we conclude now from this mainly theoretical study that applying the concept of
institutional-economic theory to the processes taking place on urban property markets leads
to a better understanding of those processes? Obviously, we think this is the case; in this
concluding section we will argue why. We will explain why we think that institutional economic
theory provides a better understanding of urban development processes compared to the
explanations provided by neo-classical economists. Moreover, we will stress that institutional
economic theory should be preferred above the so-called institutional analyses. However, at
the same time we must be careful with these statements, since we haven't proven anything.
It was not our intention to falsify any of these theories, simply because it is impossible to this.
We recall that the development of an institutional-economic urban theory in this paper was
not a goat in itself, but was meant to bring us to a better understanding of property
development processes. In an international context, we noticed several dissimilarities with
respect to property market functioning. Additionally, urban property markets are characterised
by market imperfections, problematic institutional relations and market failures. In our eyes this
constitutes a demand for explanation. To achieve this goal, the strategies of the actors
involved in the processes underlying the provision of the built environment must be analyzed.
What distinguishes an urban economic theory from other economic theories is that in urban
theory economic processes are related to location: economic processes define urban spatial
development and vice versa.
We will now successively pay attention to the usefulness of institutional economic theory for
our purpose and we will specifically give our opinion about North's theory of institutional
change. The problems with respect to finding empirical evidence to test the theoretical
assumptions are discussed. Morover, we will try to answer the question if this theory indeed
brings us closer to an understanding of urban development processes. Finally, some directions
for further research are pointed out.
The strength of an urban theory based on the concept of institutional economics is in its
realistic approach to the dynamics of urban systems; the weakness of such a theory is that
it does not provide clear and straight answers to questions concerning the way the spatial-
economic development of cities takes place. Slightly oversimplified, one can argue that neo-
classical theory explains all urban development by taking the demand for land and buildings
as a starting point. In situations where supply doesn't keep step, it is assumed that either
76externalities or supply-side blockages caused by a lack of information exist. Institutional
economics also takes the demand for land and buildings as a starting point, but gives more
weight to the context in which this demand comes forward; it explains why indívidual behaviour
does not always lead to optimal allocation and why individuals sometimes lack information or
why externalities exist. In many cases a neo-classical urban model is appropriate to explain
market processes; however, on more complicated markets supply~demand relations are
affected by all kind of factors which cannot be explained by standard economic theory or
which are taken as exceptional cases, as apart from generalmarket processes. In institutional
economics five different aspects of an economy are emphasized: actors behave boundedly
rational, actors show sometimes opportunistic behaviour, in many economic processes
transaction costs are involved, and obtaining information costs money (information costs are
involved), and information is typically a-symmetric. As long as only problems ofallocatíon play
a role, then standard economic theory sufficiently explains how these are solved; as soon as
also problems of coordination occur on a market (which neo-classical theory by definition
cannot explain), then we must look for other explanations.
In this paper much attention has been paid to market imperfections and market failure. We
have attempted to show that the standard neo-classical explanation for market imperfections
- the basic assumptions of a perfect market are not met - fails to recognise that market failure
may also be caused by other market aspects; i.e. the individual agents in the development
process behave boundedly rational or show opportunistic behaviour, uncertainty remains to
define market processes, because it is too costly to obtain the necessary information,
inefficiencies in the institutional context are responsible for imperfect market conditions.
Moreover, it is important to notice that in many situations market imperfections are
successfully dealt with, not only by government intervention, but by establishing new
institutionslorganisations as well. Finally, the institutional context is characteristically dynamic;
this may affect, for example, the relations between the actors operating on the market (the
organisation of the development industry) or the level of demand for a certain rype of buildings
or on a specific location.
We have clearly distinguished market imperfections from market failures. Imperfect market
conditions are typical to urban real estate markets. Some of them are inextricably bound up
with real estate; others are connected with the institutional context and the organisation of the
development industry or inherited from the past (the existing building stock, the urban spatial
structure). The latter group of market imperfections is mainly responsible for international
77differences in property market functioning.
Sometimes imperfect market conditions lead to market failures. They may be the combined
effect of several 'imperfections,' or they may depend on changes taking place in the wider
economy. In this respect, it is important to note the dynamics underlying property markets,
being the result of institutional and~or technological change. The mechanisms that cause
market failure - in what situations will market imperiections lead to market failure - are still
unexplored.
Section Three of this paper already argued that institutional analyses of property development
processes lack a solid theoretical base (remember the argument by Ball and Harloe which was
quoted in Section Three). If we want to leave the level of describing development processes
and, instead of this, try to explain these processes, assumptions about individual behaviour
and about the meaning of the institutional context are absolute conditions for achieving this
goal. For only with the help of theoretical assumptions about individual behaviour and
institutional relations can testable hypotheses about the functioning of urban property markets
be drawn up, thus allowing us to understand the 'causalities' in property development
processes.
Our choice for the operationalisation of North's theory of institutional change In this paper
doesn't mean that other institutional theories are already excluded from the discussion. In fact,
we have already argued that institutional economic theory still lacks a clear concept about the
functioning of markets. Within the field of institutional economics many different approaches
exist; sometimes there is a coherence between these approaches, sometimes there is not.
However, there are some reasons that explain our choice of North's theory. We believe that
North's conception of new institutional economics certainly offers realistic explanations for the
functioning of markets; especially, the interpretation of dynamics in an economy and the
explanation for the iong-run change of an economy and international differences between
markets is of great value. Besides, North has adopted the assumptions about individual
behaviour that are general to new institutional economics; we consider these assumptions to
be more realistic than are the neo-classical assumptions about individual behaviour (although,
admittedly, the extent to which they are realistic cannot be tested).
When we compare North's theory with Williamson's transaction costs approach (which
contains more or less the standard concept of new institutional economics), it is clear that the
emphasis in both approaches is on different points.
78Williamson explains the distinction between markets and organisations; transaction costs are
held responsible for the decision of firms to operate on the market or to organise their
production processes via some kind of organisational structure. North focuses on the long-
term development of an economy as a whole and on international differences between
economic systems. More important with respect to our goal is that North also analyzes
relations between supply-side and demand-side actors; such an analysis makes it possible
to interpret situations in which these relations appear to be problematic. Translated to this
paper's problem area - the functioning of the urban property market - one can argue that the
transaction cost approach explains the role of organisations and markets with respect to the
way property development processes are 'organised,' but the meaning of the institutional
context, problematic scscial relations, international differences with respect to property
development processes, changes in social relations, demand levels and institutional
structures, etc. are not part of the transaction-cost-approach' study objective. Besides,
Williamson is still close to neo-classical economics and his concept of market failure and
market imperfections is limited in its scope; it doesn't bring us any further than neo-classical
economics does.
Scott is a well-known interpreter of Williamson's theory with respect to urban and regional
restructuring dynamics (Scott, 199.); he has incorporated 'transaction cost analysis' into
location theory. Scott analyzes restructuring processes on the demand side of the urban
property market, affecting locational choices of firms. These economic restructuring processes
are, more precisely, processes of vertical disintegration, based on the principle that firms
choose to solve their coordination problems via the market (and not via a new organisational
structure). Therefore, companies relocate their place of business to be in each other's
proximity, thus reducing transaction costs.
This approach heips to understand locational choices of firms and, consequently, the changing
demand for office and industrial buildings on a specific location. However, it is apparently
implicitly assumed that the supply of buildings automatically keeps up. We do not reject Scott's
analysis because of this assumption - for, Scott's objective is different from ours and he
intends to explain locational choices of firms and not problematic supply~demand relations on
urban property markets - but rather because it is just not useful for our analysis. We do not
argue that supply~demand relations on urban property markets are by definition problematic
and should therefore be the starting point of every study of urban dynamics; that would be
nonsense. But when we confine ourselves to the contents of this paper in which we have
made a plea that at any rate more attention must be paid to property development processes,
I
79then we must conclude that a study based on the transaction cost approach is not the best
way to achieve this goal. Other concepts in the field of institutional economics - for example
Hodgson's neo-institutional economic theory - are left out of the analysis in this paper, but
this is by no means done, because we think that they are useless. It is worthwhile to study
other institutional concepts more intensely, especially with respect to conceptions about
government intervention in the market and about the nexus of institutional relations within the
development industry since, in North's theory, these aspects are not sufficiently analyzed.
Besides, more attention should be paid to differences between local markets.
A general difficulty with institutional theory is the empirical testing of the assumptions about
individual behaviour and the meaning of the institutional context. We have tried to
operationalise the assumptions into hypotheses about the strategies of actors who are
involved in the property development industry, about the relations between these actors, about
the meaning of uncertainty on urban property markets and, particularly, about market failures.
However, we must conclude that empirical testing of these hypotheses is still problematic.
In this respect we refer to a recent article by Henry in which the author criticizes Scott's theory
about locational preferences of firms, which we discussed above for its lack of empirical
evidence with respect to the main hypotheses in this theory (Henry, 1992).
Henry criticizes the empirical methods used by Scott in identifying the New Industrial Spaces;
the latter are central to Scott's theoretical concept. According to Scott, the New Industrial
Spaces are the spatial result of the transaction costs' mechanism, assuming a causal link
between the reduction of transaction costs by firms and the formation of new agglomerations.
A detailed discussion of Henry's partly theoretical and partly empirical critique on Scott's
concept falls outside the scope of this paper. However, his comments with respect to the lack
of empiricalevidence for Scott's explanations of location processes are quoted here, because
they are valid for a discussion of institutional theory in general.
Scott has put forward two forms of evidence for the causal processes behind the New
Industrial Spaces, which de facto comes to the expansion of high-technology sectors in a
specific region. Yet, so Henry argues, the mere appearance of increased numbers of
establishments does not provide any information as to the actual locational process which has
created the pattern.
'First, it says nothing about whether the increased (external) production linkages
created from such agglomeration growth are local or not (.. .). Second, if says nothing
about whether any local linkages created actually played a role in the location process
80of the firm' (Henry, 1992.~ p. 384).
These problems seem to be characteristic to institutional theory: it is problematic to test any
theoretical causal mechanism based in institutional theory in a real market situation, because
so many different aspects being part of the institutional context play a role. Probably, we must
content ourselves with making causal mechanisms plausible.
Finally, are we any closer now to an understanding of property development processes? We
wanted to know more about the strategies of the actors involved in the property development
process, in order to understand the outcome of these processes, the organisation of the
development industry, the occurrence of market imperfections and market failures, the type
of property that is developed, price developments, and - with respect to all these points -
locational differences, changes in time and international differences. Certainly, we haven't
been able to explain all these aspects of urban property markets. We have already anticipated
this result by stating in the starting sections of the paper that our intention was not explicitly
to prove anything, but (more modestly) namely to add to a better understanding of urban
property market functioning.
Summarised, institutional economic theory certainly helps to understand why property
development takes place and why it does not. However, to make a connection to location and
locational characteristics remains problematic. We do not yet possess the necessary tools, for
instance, to analyze the differences between local property markets; why is the outcome of
property development in one city more successful - in terms of amount, type and quality -
than in other cities?
We conclude this paper now with some suggestions for further research:
(1) A study of the different approaches within the field of institutional theory and
of their use in the field of urban economics. It is necessary to investigate the
possibilities of operationalisation of these institutional approaches. Moreover,
it would be interesting to compare the application of institutional theory in
studies of the urban economy with similar attempts in other disciplines, like
environment economics.
(2) A detailed empirical study of causal relations between imperfect market
81conditions and market failures on urban properry markets. The objective would
be to find out when and under what circumstances market failures appear.
(3) A detailed empirical study of property development processes and the
organisation of the property development industry in Dutch cities, focusing on
the strategies of and the institutional relations between the groups of actors
that are involved in these processes. Links between urban property market
functioning and local economic growth should also be part of this analysis. In
this case the objective would be to identify the "driving forces" underlying
property development in Dutch cities.
(4) An international study of property development processes and the organisation
of the property development industry. The emphasis should be on institutional
relations within the property development industry and the wider economic
context and the impact of urban policy, thus trying to recognise "optimal
institutional structures." This would add to a better basis for urban spatial-
economic policies.
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